House money effects, risk preferences and the public goods game

Lin, Jing; Cheo, Roland

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.037

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…In particular, there seems to be a "housemoney" effect referring to more risk-taking with windfall money than with own money, which has been observed in public goods games with mixed results (e.g. Harrison, 2007;Jing, & Cheo, 2013, Bailey, Ramalingam, & Stoddard, 2022. For example, Jin, & Cheo (2013) find significantly higher contributions in a gain-framed than in a loss-framed house money public goods game.…”

Section: Effects Of the Loss Framingmentioning

confidence: 97%

A Real Effort vs. Standard Public Goods Experiment: Overall More All-or-Nothing, Lower Average Contributions and Men Become More Selfish in the Effort-Loss Frame

Schütze,

Wichardt

2023

SSRN Journal

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Section: Effects Of the Loss Framingmentioning

confidence: 97%

A Real Effort vs. Standard Public Goods Experiment: Overall More All-or-Nothing, Lower Average Contributions and Men Become More Selfish in the Effort-Loss Frame

Schütze,

Wichardt

2023

SSRN Journal

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“…However, if the house money effect would differ among participants, our regression results could be misinterpreted. For instance, there is evidence that house money effects occur especially among participants who are more risk averse [51] and that women are more risk averse than men [52]. Then a lower average contribution by women (other things equal) would not necessarily imply less pro-social preferences than men, but could also result from a lower risk tolerance.…”

Section: Estimating Voluntary Cash Transfers Through a Vcm Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Do Governance Perceptions Affect Cooperativeness? Evidence from Small-Scale Irrigation Schemes in Northern Ghana

2022

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We use household survey data and results from a lab-in-the-field experiment to examine the impact of governance perceptions on the cooperativeness of water users in the maintenance of 19 small-scale irrigation schemes in northern Ghana. Cooperativeness is measured by two indicators, one indicator derived from the experiment and the other obtained from the survey. We distinguish the governance perceptions of users into six main components, and regress the two indicators on these six components. We consistently find for both indicators that cooperativeness is lower when users perceive that their water user association (WUA) is more successful in resolving conflicts. We also find that perceptions of accountability, transparency, and participation in governance jointly affect cooperativeness in a positive way, but collinearity problems refrain us from identifying which component(s) do(es) so. Type of leadership—whether or not the WUA leader was democratically elected—does not have a significant effect on cooperativeness, while having received irrigation-related training positively affects cooperativeness as measured by labor contributions to scheme maintenance. We argue that these novel insights can be of great importance for promoting sustainable management of small-scale irrigation schemes, but needs further research to examine its external validity.

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“…The authors find that participants who required greater effort to earn their endowments are less cooperative than their counterparts who needed less effort in the earning task. Recently, Jing and Cheo (2013) conducted a one-shot public good game with three frames: “gain,” “covered loss,” and “real loss.” They observe higher contributions in the former than in the two latter treatments, concluding that house money effect in windfall gains is the main driver of difference between the treatments rather than loss aversion.…”

Section: Related Public Good Game Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Payment procedure in a public good game experiment: The effects of endowment timing, tangibility, and source.

Waichman¹,

Voss²

2016

Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics

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We study whether and how payment procedure affects behavior in a repeated public good game. To this end, we conducted five treatments, varying the times of paying the initial endowment (week before, before, or after the decisions) and the source of the initial endowment (windfall vs. earned money in a real-effort task). We find little evidence for effects of tangible endowment, windfall endowment, or prepaid endowment. However, we observe that payment procedures do influence decisions in a repeated public good game experiment.

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House money effects, risk preferences and the public goods game

Cited by 9 publications

References 7 publications

A Real Effort vs. Standard Public Goods Experiment: Overall More All-or-Nothing, Lower Average Contributions and Men Become More Selfish in the Effort-Loss Frame

A Real Effort vs. Standard Public Goods Experiment: Overall More All-or-Nothing, Lower Average Contributions and Men Become More Selfish in the Effort-Loss Frame

Do Governance Perceptions Affect Cooperativeness? Evidence from Small-Scale Irrigation Schemes in Northern Ghana

Payment procedure in a public good game experiment: The effects of endowment timing, tangibility, and source.

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