HOTSPOT: Crossing the Air-Gap Between Isolated PCs and Nearby Smartphones Using Temperature

Guri, Mordechai

doi:10.1109/eisic49498.2019.9108874

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The effective range of these techniques is limited to devices within proximity, roughly less than 20 meters, necessitating that the corresponding malware infects both sender and receiver devices to establish the communication link or that the adversary manipulates the receiving party through other means. Research in this domain reveals the feasibility of air-gap covert channels across diverse media such as acoustic [30,31], optical [32,33], seismic [34], magnetic [35,36], thermal [37,38], radio-frequency [39,40], etc., highlighting their versatility and the broad spectrum of potential applications for secure or clandestine information exchange.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gaming the system: Tetromino-based covert channels and their impact on mobile security

Vasilellis,

Botsos,

Anagnostopoulou

et al. 2024

Preprint

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Trojan droppers consistently emerge as formidable malware threats, particularly within the Android ecosystem. Traditional malware detection strategies focus on identifying payloads upon execution or intercepting malicious downloads from compromised sources. Despite rigorous efforts to fortify network defenses against such droppers, these measures inadvertently highlight the necessity for exploring unconventional infiltration methodologies. This study expands on covert channel attacks, proposing the utilizationof gaming platforms, notably the classic Tetris arcade game, as a novel vector for malicious payload delivery. Our methodology diverges from conventional network-based attacks by embedding malicious payloads within the game’s Tetromino pieces. Through a custom-made application that masquerades as a benign Tetris variant, we facilitate the delivery and execution of malicious payloads on target devices within 3 to 7 minutes. This process is enabled by integrating the Shikata-Ga-Nai polymorphic encoder, an autosuggestion algorithm and mapping Tetromino shapes to a Meterpreter payload, thereby innovating payload delivery via gameplay suggestions. Our work provides a novel covert channel attack methodology which merges gamification with malicious payload delivery. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that introduces gamification and autosuggestion mechanisms for payload delivery. We present an in-depth analysis of the proposed attack, along with a number of countermeasures to mitigate such threats, emphasizing the importance of enhanced user awareness and prudent management of application permissions.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gaming the system: Tetromino-based covert channels and their impact on mobile security

Vasilellis,

Botsos,

Anagnostopoulou

et al. 2024

Preprint

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“…Air-gap information can be transmitted using temperature changes in the PC [ 41 , 50 , 51 ]. The CPU of the PC requires an amount of power proportional to the workload requested.…”

Section: Air-gap Attack Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Air-Gap Attacks: Fundamentals, Transport Means, Attack Scenarios and Challenges

Park

Yoo

et al. 2023

Sensors

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Major public institutions and organizations that handle sensitive data frequently enforce strong security policies by implementing network separation policies that segregates their internal work networks and internet network using air gaps to prevent the leakage of confidential information. Such closed networks have long been considered the most secure technique for protecting data; however, studies have shown that they are no longer effective in providing a safe data protection environment. Research on air-gap attacks remains in its infancy stage. Studies have been conducted to check the method and demonstrate the possibility of transmitting data using various transmission media available within the closed network. These transmission media include optical signals such as HDD LEDs, acoustic signals such as speakers, and the electrical signals of power lines. This paper examines various media used for air-gap attacks by analyzing different techniques and their essential functions, strengths, and limitations. The findings of this survey and the follow-up analysis aim to assist companies and organizations in protecting their information by providing an understanding of air-gap attacks and their current trends.

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“…Surprisingly, this transmission could be sensed in a distance of 9 m, but merely with a data rate of less than 1 bit per minute. This has later been used to show a unidirectional channel with a customary smartphone as receiver [11] over half a meter at 0.02 bps. Here, transmission speed and distance has not been the focus, but the fact that the attack is possible in a "walk-by" scenario.…”

Section: Data Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, an attacker can only use hardware that is available on site-applying additional equipment is not an option. Academic research has explored different ways of attacking air-gapped systems through optical [19,40], acoustic [10,14,18], thermal [11,15], or even electromagnetic [26] and power-dependent [25] communication channels. Most of these approaches only enable a unidirectional communication, that is, either data infiltration or exfiltration.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

LaserShark: Establishing Fast, Bidirectional Communication into Air-Gapped Systems

Kühnapfel¹,

Preußler²,

Noppel³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Physical isolation, so called air-gapping, is an effective method for protecting security-critical computers and networks. While it might be possible to introduce malicious code through the supply chain, insider attacks, or social engineering, communicating with the outside world is prevented. Different approaches to breach this essential line of defense have been developed based on electromagnetic, acoustic, and optical communication channels. However, all of these approaches are limited in either data rate or distance, and frequently offer only exfiltration of data. We present a novel approach to infiltrate data to and exfiltrate data from air-gapped systems without any additional hardware on-site. By aiming lasers at already built-in LEDs and recording their response, we are the first to enable a longdistance (25 m), bidirectional, and fast (18.2 kbps in & 100 kbps out) covert communication channel. The approach can be used against any office device that operates LEDs at the CPU's GPIO interface. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Systems security.

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HOTSPOT: Crossing the Air-Gap Between Isolated PCs and Nearby Smartphones Using Temperature

Cited by 9 publications

References 25 publications

Gaming the system: Tetromino-based covert channels and their impact on mobile security

Gaming the system: Tetromino-based covert channels and their impact on mobile security

A Survey on Air-Gap Attacks: Fundamentals, Transport Means, Attack Scenarios and Challenges

LaserShark: Establishing Fast, Bidirectional Communication into Air-Gapped Systems

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