2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2016.04.002
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Hostility and deal completion likelihood in international acquisitions: The moderating effect of information leakage

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
2
1

Citation Types

0
7
0

Year Published

2016
2016
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
7

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 14 publications
(8 citation statements)
references
References 34 publications
0
7
0
Order By: Relevance
“…New information revealed after the deal announcement leads to changes in profitability (Hotchkiss et al , 2005). Preventing leakage of information is vital for merger negotiation (Ngo and Susnjara, 2016). However, an early strategic announcement about the synergies reduces friction and increases completion (Aktas et al , 2018).…”
Section: Content Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…New information revealed after the deal announcement leads to changes in profitability (Hotchkiss et al , 2005). Preventing leakage of information is vital for merger negotiation (Ngo and Susnjara, 2016). However, an early strategic announcement about the synergies reduces friction and increases completion (Aktas et al , 2018).…”
Section: Content Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, success or failure of the deal means “completion or incompletion of the publicly announced acquisition,” “agreement or disagreement of the deal.” To the best of our knowledge on M&A stream, there is a dearth of research on the completion likelihood of M&A transactions across the world economy for reasons, including the causes of abandoned negotiations, the determinants of failed takeovers, stock performance around negotiation process, and the roles of top-level management team in delayed or unsuccessful deals (except some recent studies, e.g. Caiazza and Pozzolo, 2016; Ngo and Susnjara, 2016; Muehlfeld et al , 2012). Although a large amount of research has published on why M&A fail to create value to shareholders (announcement returns) and fail to improve accounting performance (post-merger stage) in corporate finance and strategy literatures (Asquith, 1983; Chang and Suk, 1998; De Bernardis and Giustiniano, 2015; McCann and Ackrill, 2015; Munjal and Pereira, 2015; also see reviews by Ferreira et al , 2014b; Haleblian et al , 2009; Lebedev et al , 2015; Marks and Mirvis, 2011; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Reddy, 2014; Shimizu et al , 2004; Yaghoubi et al , 2016), there are hardly a few empirical/survey studies that analyze abandoned deals or completion likelihood of M&A negotiations (Dikova et al , 2010; Graebner et al , 2010; Muehlfeld et al , 2007, 2012; Ngo and Susnjara, 2016; Roos and Postma, 2016; Zhang et al , 2011).…”
Section: Theoretical Framework and Relevant Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Caiazza and Pozzolo, 2016; Ngo and Susnjara, 2016; Muehlfeld et al , 2012). Although a large amount of research has published on why M&A fail to create value to shareholders (announcement returns) and fail to improve accounting performance (post-merger stage) in corporate finance and strategy literatures (Asquith, 1983; Chang and Suk, 1998; De Bernardis and Giustiniano, 2015; McCann and Ackrill, 2015; Munjal and Pereira, 2015; also see reviews by Ferreira et al , 2014b; Haleblian et al , 2009; Lebedev et al , 2015; Marks and Mirvis, 2011; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Reddy, 2014; Shimizu et al , 2004; Yaghoubi et al , 2016), there are hardly a few empirical/survey studies that analyze abandoned deals or completion likelihood of M&A negotiations (Dikova et al , 2010; Graebner et al , 2010; Muehlfeld et al , 2007, 2012; Ngo and Susnjara, 2016; Roos and Postma, 2016; Zhang et al , 2011). In fact, some recent literature-review papers have confirmed the scant research in this particular stream – negotiation process (Ahammad et al , 2016; Caiazza and Volpe, 2015; Friedman et al , 2015; Lee et al , 2014).…”
Section: Theoretical Framework and Relevant Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The focus in acquisition completion literature is on the public takeover period which starts from the public announcement and ends at the resolution of an acquisition deal (Muehlfeld et al , 2007, 2012; Dikova et al , 2010; Zhang et al , 2011; Caiazza and Pozzolo, 2016; Lim and Lee, 2016, 2017; Ngo and Susnjara, 2016; Zhou et al , 2016; Doan et al , 2018; He and Zhang, 2018). The M&A completion research is confined to bids completed or bids abandoned after a public announcement because decisions regarding completion or abandonment after a public announcement are more likely to be determined by the acquirer with more available information (Dikova et al , 2010; Lim and Lee, 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%