Host state reactions to home state diaspora engagement policies: Rethinking state sovereignty and limits of diaspora governance

Abstract

During the last few decades, institutions, policies, and other state‐sponsored mechanisms linking home states and diasporas have expanded well beyond traditional areas. Numerous states have established diaspora engagement policies and institutions to tap diaspora resources and maximize their political, economic, and cultural interests. Previous research largely focused on these policies’ motivations and their impact on diasporas, with little attention being paid to the host states’ context. How do host states react to other states’ diaspora engagement policies within their borders? Where do host states draw the line for other states’ involvement in their territory? In this article, we examine Turkey's diaspora engagement initiatives in European countries, and zero in on host states’ reactions to these extraterritorial activities. We argue that diaspora engagement has limits and its scope is determined by the foreign and domestic political processes of the host states and their concern over their sovereignty and security.

Mapping the Russian Political Influence Ecosystem: The Night Wolves Biker Gang

“…Recent bans on the Russian media introduced in many Western countries in response to Russia’s military invasion and war crimes in Ukraine, along with the fragmentation of the public sphere in Russia domestically, have brought the Russian migrant publics to the fore of human geopolitics, amplifying their roles as conduits of “soft-” and “sharp power” to undermine the integrity of democratic institutions (Kleiner et al, 2023). This is not to say that all Russian diasporas engage in human geopolitics—the online public sphere also provides opportunities to express dissenting opinions (for a description of this process in Turkey, see Baser & Fasery, 2022). Furthermore, political influencers who engage in foreign interference or disinformation on behalf of the Russian state might be motivated by various incentives, some of which might be non-monetary—such as patriotism, various administrative privileges, or a fear of retribution (Harris, 2021).…”

Diaspora as socio‐material assemblage: Political agency in the Kurdish freedom movement's representations of homeland

“…Consequently, they contribute to the production and circulation of geopolitical ideas. Sending states seek to engage diasporas to gain global competitiveness (Ho, 2011), causing the reaction of the host states, which establish new barriers and boundaries around diasporas (Başer and Féron, 2022). But diasporas can also be the means for the circulation of subaltern diplomacies and counter‐hegemonic ideas (Ferretti, 2021), coexisting in ‘multiple worlds’ (Ling, 2014), and intertwining the centre and the margins (Ho and McConnell, 2019).…”

Turkish-Dutch Mosque Students Negotiating Identities and Belonging in The Netherlands

“…First, mosque education (which is not inspected by formal educational authorities) is often perceived as linked to religious radicalization (Gholami 2017;Cherti et al 2011;. Second, there are pronounced concerns among European policymakers particularly about Diyanet mosques (the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs) teaching civic allegiance to the Turkish state which sponsors the mosque classes as a part of their diaspora governance policies (Baser and Féron 2021), and, hence, alienating young Muslims from the mainstream Western society where they live (Sözeri et al 2022).…”