Hollowing out and hardening the state: European integration and the Italian economy

Sala, Vincent Della

doi:10.1080/01402389708425173

Cited by 92 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…For example, once Italy had joined the technical part of the EMS -the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) -in 1979, it became apparent that monetary financing had to be reduced for Italy to remain in the system. The 1992 and 1993 reforms were legal requirements to be fulfilled before Italy could participate in the final stage of EMU, although their completion, earlier than required, is explained by other factors, including pressure from financial markets (Della Sala 1997).…”

Section: The External Factors: the International And European Monetarmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: Lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy

Quaglia¹

2005

West European Politics

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This article proposes a three-tier framework for analysing the politics of central bank independence. International factors explain the general trend towards central bank independence. However, they are framed differently by various national systems. At the national level, for heuristic purposes, the analysis can be structured by focusing on 'suppliers' and 'demanders' of central bank independence. The former are the political authorities, whereas the latter are socioeconomic forces and interest groups, with the central bank positioned in-between. At the micro-institutional level, central banks can be influential economic and political actors situated at the interface between levels of governance. The added value of this integrated framework is appraised using one case study, the Bank of Italy's path to independence, which is compared with the experience of the Bank of England and the Bundesbank. In contrast to many works on central bank independence, the methodology adopted here is qualitative, rather than quantitative, and is grounded in empirical research.Central banks are complex and multi-faceted institutions, which stand at the interface between politics and economics, states and markets, international and national governance. The interlocking dimensions of these institutions have been reflected by a variegated academic literature, which had initially been confined to economics but which was later developed by political economists, until eventually being rediscovered by political scientists.The review of the state of the art literature on the politics of central bank independence reveals that explanations have generally been sought either at national or international level, with limited attempts to integrate both dimensions. Furthermore, a third level of analysis investigating the resources, preferences and strategies of the central banks has remained

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Section: The External Factors: the International And European Monetarmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: Lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy

Quaglia¹

2005

West European Politics

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“…For the state to function effectively, it must have the power to regulate business and consumer activities as encapsulated in the idea of the democratic ''regulatory state'' (Della Sala, 1997). The regulatory state determines a minimal set of general guidelines to govern the economy, leaving details to either lower-level agencies or the market.…”

Section: The Empowerment Of Russian Consumersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Purchasing Power: Consumer Empowerment and Adaptation to the Free Market in Russia

Treadwell

Pridemore

2004

J Consum Policy

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This article explores adaptations in Russian consumer behavior to market capitalism, impediments to that process, and the effects citizens' survival strategies may have on Russia's continued political and social evolution. Capitalism not only brought Russians a market economy of unenforced legislation, insufficient regulatory institutions, and widespread corruption, but also new ideas including individual rights, self-reliance, and increased expectations for market transactions, which contribute to public mobilization and legal reform designed to protect and empower consumers. Despite the ambivalence many citizens feel toward the market and the difficulties associated with the struggling economy and widespread mafia influence, emerging consumer advocacy groups have begun holding businesses and the government accountable. Evidence suggests that consumer concerns are serving as a vehicle for public mobilization in areas that are broadly significant to Russia's lingering problems. Finally, though the focus of this paper is on Russian consumers, it is believed that many of the conclusions generated could be extended to other countries with emerging markets.

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“…The rate of growth of the public debt declined, and budget deficits fell sharply from over 10 percent of gross domestic product in 1992 to a projected level of under 3 percent in 1997. This fiscal adjustment occurred during a period of sluggish economic growth (Della Sala 1997;Walsh 1998).…”

Section: Fiscal Adjustment 1992-7mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One often-cited reason for the Italian propensity to devalue and to run large deficits is the presence of a series of coalition governments of short duration (Della Sala 1997;Pasquino 1987). Such governments have little incentive to bear the political costs of adjustment for two reasons.…”

Section: Political Instabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Political bases of macroeconomic adjustment: evidence from the Italian experience

Walsh¹

1999

Journal of European Public Policy

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This article tests political explanations of policy adjustment to macroeconomic imbalances against the Italian experience since the late 1970s. After describing Italian governments' attempts to implement macroeconomic policy adjustment, I evaluate four possible causes of policy changes: political instability, a 'tying hands' strategy of entangling the state in international commitments, analysis of the aggregate costs of pursuing macroeconomic policies that diverge from the policies of other important states, and the preferences of domestic groups. I evaluate the utility of each explanation according to its ability to answer two empirical questions: Why was adjustment delayed in Italy until about 1988? And why has the form of macroeconomic policy adjustment -monetary or fiscal -changed over time? The evidence indicates that answering these questions requires specifying how the costs of various macroeconomic policy mixes fall on domestic groups, and then determining which of these groups have the most political influence.

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Hollowing out and hardening the state: European integration and the Italian economy

Cited by 92 publications

References 18 publications

An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: Lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy

An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: Lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy

Purchasing Power: Consumer Empowerment and Adaptation to the Free Market in Russia

Political bases of macroeconomic adjustment: evidence from the Italian experience

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