Hobbes’s Practical Politics: Political, Sociological and Economistic Ways of Avoiding a State of Nature

Abstract

This paper offers a systematic analysis of Hobbes’s practical political thought. Hobbes’s abstract philosophy is rightly celebrated, but he also gave much practical advice on how to avoid disorder. Yet he is typically interpreted too narrowly in this respect, especially by those who only read him economistically. Other scholars supplement this economistic focus with sociological or political interpretations, but to my knowledge, no one stresses all three aspects of his thought. This paper thus examines each of Hobbes’s practical proposals for avoiding corruption and a state of nature. Hobbes clearly uses economistic, sociological and political approaches, which involve shaping incentives, desires/preferences, and opportunities, respectively. This intentionally anachronistic framework helps us see further, highlighting Hobbes’s rich and wide-ranging practical proposals for avoiding disorder – a crucial part of his theory.

How (Not) to Use the History of Political Thought for Contemporary Purposes

“…Hobbes clearly grasps how institutions can be shaped to control not only incentives but also what political scientists call “the opportunity structure.” He recommends what principal–agent theorists call “contract design” ( ex ante ) and “fire alarms” ( ex post ). He discusses other types of institutional constraints and incentives elsewhere (Blau 2020).…”

“…He recommends what principal-agent theorists call "contract design" (ex ante) and "fire alarms" (ex post). He discusses other types of institutional constraints and incentives elsewhere (Blau 2020).…”