Historical perspectives on the 2022 electoral cycle in France

Abstract

This series of three essays explores the stakes and outcomes of the 2022 French electoral cycle. Written in real time, they call attention to several emerging trends in French politics, including the collapse of both the traditional political parties and the left–right divide, the dynamics of attraction and repulsion elicited by Macron’s personality, the far right’s ‘arrival’ as a mainstream party, and the cascading fractures that divide and weaken the left.

Dancing with the devil? Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen and the articulation of a new political divide in France

“…The new divide specifically under‐represents left‐wing ideas by shifting the centre of gravity of the party system to the Right. Macron's rhetorical commitment to being both Left and Right co‐existed with a neoliberal economic programme and a rightward shift on immigration and law and order, leading commentators to argue that the major axis of competition in France today is between factions of the Right (Chabal et al, 2023, p. 4; Rouban, 2023). This shift is perceived by French voters, who positioned Macron at 5.2 on a Left/Right scale of 1–10 in March 2017 and at 6.7 by May 2018 (Le Monde, 2018).…”

“…On her part, Le Pen gained support primarily from worse‐off, working‐class, lower educated and rural voters for whom the nation‐state remains the main political referent. Since taking over the party from her father, she has also made her most significant gains away from big cities, in the deindustrialised zones of Northern France and the traditionally conservative Mediterranean basin (Foucault, 2017; Chabal et al, 2023, pp. 12–13).…”

The French Elections of 2022: Macron's Half Victory in a Changing Political Landscape

“…In the legislative elections' first round, for instance, 45% of workers chose the RN, along with 28% of those without a high‐school diploma, and 31% who describe themselves as ‘underprivileged’ (Chabal and Behrent, 2022, p. 528). The RN has also done particularly well in the deindustrialized zones of Northern France and the traditionally conservative Mediterranean basin (Chabal et al, 2023, pp. 12–13).…”

“…Geography and education, however, largely divide the far‐right and far‐left electorates, with 26% of highly educated voter choosing Mélenchon in the presidential elections (Kuhn, 2022, p. 467) and 32% of the highly educated choosing NUPES in the parliamentary elections (Chabal and Behrent, 2022, p. 528). These political forces also have a strong base within larger urban centres such as Paris, Lyon and Marseille (Chabal et al, 2023, pp. 12–13).…”