Historical explanation, folk psychology, and narrative

Abstract

This paper argues history differs from natural science in relying on folk psychology and so narrative explanations. In narratives, actions, beliefs, and proattitudes are joined by conditional and volitional connections. Conditional connections exist when beliefs and pro-attitudes pick up themes from one another.Volitional connections exist when agents command themselves to do something having decided to do it because of a pro-attitude they hold. The paper defends the epistemic legitimacy of narratives by arguing we have legitimate grounds for postulating conditional and volitional connections since they are given to us by a folk psychology we accept as true. HISTORICAL EXPLANATION, FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, AND NARRATIVE I. PreliminariesWhen we say that Susan crossed the road to buy a sandwich, we explain her action by attributing to her a desire to buy a sandwich and a belief that she can do so across the road. Our standard way of explaining human actions is by reference to the beliefs and pro-attitudes of actors. We should not be surprised, therefore, that historical explanations often appeal to beliefs and pro-attitudes. The most obvious examples are explanations of particular actions, whether decided upon by an individual or a group. Consider, for example, Colin Matthew's explanation of W. E.Gladstone's sensational production in 1886 of the controversial Government of Ireland Bill. Matthew describes how the Liberal Party was excluded from the process of discussion and how even the Cabinet was not given adequate time to examine the proposals. 'Gladstone,' he explains, 'hoped to trump Cabinet doubts and party unease by the production of a great bill' (Matthew, 1995, p. 236). The tactics Gladstone deployed are explained here by reference to both his wish to win support for his proposals and his belief, albeit surrounded by doubts, that he could do so through the drama of a great bill. A similar form of explanation appears whenever historians treat collective entities such as classes, institutions, and states as akin to people by ascribing to them things such as intentions.Numerous historical explanations work by pointing to the beliefs and proattitudes that informed an action or set of actions. Historians explain all sorts of aspects of life in this way, including not only particular actions or sets of actions, but

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