How can we think productively about the sweep of land connecting China's southwest, Myanmar's north, India's northeast, Bangladesh, and the Bay of Bengal? In its entirety, this region is rarely the focus of academic inquiry, even though the production of knowledge about some parts has been increasing rapidly. Stretching from the waterlogged environment of the world's largest river delta to the snowtopped slopes of the world's highest mountain range, and from the exceptionally heavy monsoons in the west to much lower-and long-term declining (Tan et al. 2017)-rainfall in the east, it is the home of a range of agro-ecological topographies and the meeting point of three of the earth's biodiversity hotspots. 1 So what is the point of considering this physically and environmentally varied zone as a single region, tentatively referred to as the "India-China corridor"? 2 Paradoxically, it is its persistent diversity that sets it apart from surrounding regions. First, the region's environmental variety has contributed to its always having been politically fractured. It was never under single common rulealthough, for a short while, British imperial designs came close. 3 As a result, local forms of sovereignty and territoriality developed out of long histories of political fragmentation and cultural variation, and these persist today. Second, the postcolonial states-India, Bangladesh, 4 Burma/Myanmar, and China-view their sections of it primarily in terms of security. After the mid-twentieth century, they interdicted economic connections across their borders, thwarting infrastructural upgrading and regional growth. 5 And third, the region has long been marginalized geopolitically. State elites considered it to be a problematic and unmanageable periphery in which local wars, ethnic confrontations, and drug lords f lourished; where resources were hard to exploit; and where state control was haphazard and expensive. As a result, it turned into a political geography of silence and erasure (Grundy-Warr and Sidaway 2006).