Highly reflective reasoners show no signs of belief inhibition

Svedholm-Häkkinen, Annika M.

doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.11.008

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…It could be that optimal, efficient conflict detection minimizes this negative consequence. In other words, maybe the most efficient conflict detectors are less affected by the conflict and show less processing slow down than less efficient detectors (see Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015, for a related point). Issues of this sort complicate more graded or qualitative interpretations of the effect sizes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning

Frey

Johnson

Neys

2018

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

129

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Decades of reasoning and decision-making research have established that human judgment is often biased by intuitive heuristics. Recent "error" or bias detection studies have focused on reasoners' abilities to detect whether their heuristic answer conflicts with logical or probabilistic principles. A key open question is whether there are individual differences in this bias detection efficiency. Here we present three studies in which co-registration of different error detection measures (confidence, response time and confidence response time) allowed us to assess bias detection sensitivity at the individual participant level in a range of reasoning tasks. The results indicate that although most individuals show robust bias detection, as indexed by increased latencies and decreased confidence, there is a subgroup of reasoners who consistently fail to do so. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for the field.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning

Frey

Johnson

Neys

2018

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

129

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…If anything, it grows stronger although only among high-NFC individuals, who due to their presumed metacognitive advantage (Mata et al, 2013;Pennycook et al, 2017) gain insight into the tricky nature of the problems and therefore sub-sequently improve their performance with multiple encounters of the CRT, unlike their intuitive counterparts. While this conjecture remains to be examined in more detail by future research, the results of the present study point out some discrepancies in reasoning processes among participants with analytic and intuitive self-reported thinking disposition, and thus highlight the need to change the focus of research in this area to the individual differences among subgroups of reasoners (Mata et al, 2013;Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 72%

These Problems Sound Familiar to Me: Previous Exposure, Cognitive Reflection Test, and the Moderating Role of Analytic Thinking

Šrol¹

2018

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One of the current topics in research on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is its growing familiarity among the general public. Surprisingly, Bialek and Pennycook (2017) showed that previous exposure does not diminish the CRT's predictive power in Heuristics and Biases (H&B) tasks, but proposed that the relationship is moderated by analytic thinking, a conjecture tested in the present study. Participants (N = 365) filled in the CRT, Need for Cognition (NFC) scale, and a battery of H&B problems. While the CRT did retain its predictive power in the H&B performance, regardless of participants' self-reported thinking dispositions and exposure, both of these factors moderated the relationship, such that exposure increased CRT's predictive power in H&B tasks, albeit only among high-NFC individuals. Present results converge with studies showing that prior exposure does not invalidate the use of CRT, while offering some novel evidence for the metacognitive disadvantage account proposed by Bialek and Pennycook (2 01 7).

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“…12 There is some evidence that System 1 thoughts are not extinguished in response to counterevidence but are rather moved to the level of the non-conscious in response to such evidence (Svedholm-Häkkinen 2015). If this view is correct, then the 'fleeing' state is unlikely to be a System 1 thought, since the 'fleeing' state remains conscious for most subjects.…”

Section: V2 Is the 'Fleeing' State A Delusion?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others

Helton¹

2021

Preprint

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I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further argue that these attributions are unrevisable in a certain sense and that this result can be used to as part of an argument that these attributions are not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally.

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Highly reflective reasoners show no signs of belief inhibition

Cited by 16 publications

References 27 publications

Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning

Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning

These Problems Sound Familiar to Me: Previous Exposure, Cognitive Reflection Test, and the Moderating Role of Analytic Thinking

Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others

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