High‐Stakes Gambling with Unknown Outcomes: Justifying the Precautionary Principle

Justifying the Precautionary Principle as a political principle

“…In the last years, growing literature on the PP suggests that there is indeed such a kind of risk that makes precaution mandatory. Authors such as Gardiner (2006), Sandin (2007), Aven (2010), Munthe (2011) Petrenko & McArthur (2011 and Szentkirályi (2019) underline one fundamental aspect of the PP which is salient in the well-known version of the PP that UNESCO endorses: 'When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm' (World Committee on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology 2005, p. 14; our italics). Under this view, the PP would urge precautionary measures when we risk 'morally unacceptable' harm.…”

“…Yet what makes harm 'morally unacceptable'? According to Petrenko & McArthur (2011), the decisive question is whether the harm might fall on others who have not freely and informedly consented to take the risk associated with the hazardous practice or technology. As they point out, playing Russian roulette may be fine if, given the circumstances, one thinks it's worth the risk; but playing Russian roulette on the head of another person that has not consented to it is simply unacceptable from a moral point of view, even if the probability of killing that person were one in many millions or just uncertain, and no matter how much you, the other person involved, or someone else could get from doing it.…”

“…menting the PP would not require assessments in terms of costs and benefits because playing with others' well-being without their informed consent is always morally unacceptable, no matter how much others/all could gain by doing it. Thus, according to Petrenko & McArthur (2011), it is a mistake to think of the PP as a consequentialist principle justified on utilitarian grounds. Instead, they think that because the PP deals with the matter of imposing undeserved risks on others 'it can be considered from the deontological and contract-theoretic positions' (Petrenko & McArthur 2011, p. 351).…”

“…For this reason, some authors think that in the end, the PP must be grounded in morality instead of purely instrumental rationality. However, while the moral obligation of not playing Russian roulette on someone else's head admits no trade-offs, public decision-making about the development of potentially dangerous activities is all about trade-offs between the precautionary moral obligation and the rest of our values, goals and needs: public decision-making does not always hon-8 Petrenko & McArthur (2011) think that only a deontological perspective can provide this moralist conception of the PP with the status of a principle. Certainly, act-consequentialism acknowledges only one principle, which is to act to promote the best consequences, and nothing warrants that, other things being equal, not imposing unconsented risk on others will always bring about the best consequences.…”

Precautionary Principles

“…The application of the harm principle normally presupposes that certain conditions are fulfilled, for example, that the harms in question must be (1) involuntarily taken, (2) sufficiently severe and (3) probable, and (4) the prescribed measures must be proportional to the harms (cf. Jensen 2002;Petrenko and McArthur 2011). If these conditions are fulfilled, the prevention principle can be applied, prescribing proportional measures to prevent the harm in question from materializing.…”