2009
DOI: 10.1080/14631370903339823
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Hierarchy of governance institutions and the pecking order of privatisation: Central–Eastern Europe and Central Asia reconsidered

Abstract: Abstract:We discuss property rights, corporate governance frameworks and privatisation outcomes in the Central Eastern Europe and Central Asia (CEECA) region. We argue that while CEECA still suffers from deficient 'higher order' institutions, this is not attracting sufficient attention of international institutions like EBRD and World Bank, which focus on 'lower order' indicators. We discuss factors that may alleviate the negative impact of the weakness in institutional environment and argue for the pecking or… Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…In contrast, private entrepreneurs need to create relational capital with administrators and politicians in order to gain access to resources. This pattern is characteristic of all partly privatised, partly reformed economies, where entrepreneurs need to engage in rent seeking to match the state sector advantages (Mickiewicz, 2009). The less transparent the government is, the more likely it is that the influence costs of the private companies will be higher compared with those incurred by state companies.…”
Section: Weak Institutions and Firms' Profitabilitymentioning
confidence: 97%
“…In contrast, private entrepreneurs need to create relational capital with administrators and politicians in order to gain access to resources. This pattern is characteristic of all partly privatised, partly reformed economies, where entrepreneurs need to engage in rent seeking to match the state sector advantages (Mickiewicz, 2009). The less transparent the government is, the more likely it is that the influence costs of the private companies will be higher compared with those incurred by state companies.…”
Section: Weak Institutions and Firms' Profitabilitymentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Further, government intervention may be rather uneven in the presence of weak institutions, which may lead some firms to succeed not via efficiency or good strategy, but by special, politically-generated gains. Higher profitability may result from political rents and state capture by specific categories of owners (Hellman 1998;Hellman et al 2002Hellman et al , 2003Slinko et al 2005;Havrylyshyn, 2006;Mickiewicz, 2009). We expect therefore that the impact of institutional reform on profitability is more varied compared with its impact on productivity, depending on the nature of the reform and the type of firm concerned.…”
Section: Institutional Reformsmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The replacement of local practices as well as the emphasis on continuous improving of financial performance can have positive impact not only on a respective subsidiary, but on the whole economy (Albu et al, 2014). However, the results can differ significantly across countries, depending for example on the approach to privatisation selected by particular transition country (Mickiewicz, 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 89%