Hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion

Williams, D. F.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2018.03.003

Cited by 48 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 80 publications

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“…In some cases, however, agents are motivated to hold beliefs because other agents respond to such beliefs in a desirable way. That is, such beliefs are "cherished" because they are socially rewarded (Kurzban 2012;von Hippel and Trivers 2011;Williams 2018). For example, certain beliefs function as badges of group membership, enabling us to signal our membership of and loyalty to desirable coalitions-a phenomenon that I return to in Sect.…”

Section: Forms Of Motivated Ignorancementioning

confidence: 96%

Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics

Williams

2020

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When the costs of acquiring knowledge outweigh the benefits of possessing it, ignorance is rational. In this paper I clarify and explore a related but more neglected phenomenon: cases in which ignorance is motivated by the anticipated costs of possessing knowledge, not acquiring it. The paper has four aims. First, I describe the psychological and social factors underlying this phenomenon of motivated ignorance. Second, I describe those conditions in which it is instrumentally rational. Third, I draw on evidence from the social sciences to argue that this phenomenon of rational motivated ignorance plays an important but often unappreciated role in one of the most socially harmful forms of ignorance today: voter ignorance of societal risks such as climate change. Finally, I consider how to address the high social costs associated with rational motivated ignorance.

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Section: Forms Of Motivated Ignorancementioning

confidence: 96%

Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics

Williams

2020

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“…Of course, they do not reflect a systematic or exhaustive review of the relevant evidence, but, taken together, provide a strong challenge to the notion that backfire is prevalent-or even common-in human belief updating. On this basis, the backfire effect currently provides rather unconvincing evidence in support of Williams's (2018;and Mandelbaum's, 2018) argument that belief updating in the neurotypical population violates Bayesian inference 3 . As Williams (2018, p. 140) himself states, "the fact that one's cousin Barry once violated Bayes optimality evidently does not undermine Bayesian models of cognition".…”

Section: The Backfire Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The empirical literature on each of these topics is vast and heterogeneous, and discussing all the evidence is well beyond the scope of this article. We thus focus primarily on the evidence referred (or alluded) to by Williams (2018).…”

Section: Evidence Of Non-bayesian Belief Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The backfire effect refers to the phenomenon whereby people become more confident in their initial belief after receiving evidence that contradicts that belief. Williams (2018) states that backfire is "most damning" (p. 142) for the notion that neurotypical belief formation is Bayesian, a position recently-and forcefully-staked out by others (Mandelbaum, 2018). The notion of backfire is indeed problematic for HBMD, primarily because the phenomenon of increasing confidence in P when presented evidence that ~P appears to directly contradict key principles of Bayesian inference.…”

Section: The Backfire Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The notion of backfire is indeed problematic for HBMD, primarily because the phenomenon of increasing confidence in P when presented evidence that ~P appears to directly contradict key principles of Bayesian inference. However, as we will highlight below, the backfire citations in Williams (2018;and in Mandelbaum, 2018) are highly selective, and, as a result, leave an impression of the prevalence of backfire that is at odds with a large body of recent evidence.…”

Section: The Backfire Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence

Tappin

Gadsby

2019

Consciousness and Cognition

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A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception-not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.

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Are clinical delusions adaptive?

Lancellotta

Bortolotti

2019

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and dementia. By and large, delusions are characterized by their behavioral manifestations and defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. In this overview paper, we ask whether delusions can be adaptive notwithstanding their negative features. Can they be a response to a crisis rather than the source of the crisis? Can they be the beginning of a solution rather than the problem? Some of the psychological, psychiatric, and philosophical literature has recently suggested that they can. We consider different types of delusions and different ways in which they can be considered as adaptive: psychologically (e.g., by increasing wellbeing, purpose in life, intrapsychic coherence, or good functioning) and biologically (e.g., by enhancing genetic fitness). Although further research is needed to map the costs and benefits of adopting and maintaining delusional beliefs, a more nuanced picture of the role of delusions in people's lives has started to emerge.This article is categorized under: Philosophy > RepresentationPhilosophy > Knowledge and BeliefNeuroscience > Cognition

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Hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion

Cited by 48 publications

References 80 publications

Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics

Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics

Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence

Are clinical delusions adaptive?

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