Hicham Bou Nassif, Endgames. Military responses to Protest in Arab Autocracies

Introduction to the Research Handbook on Civil–Military Relations

“…Since the mid-2000s, a growing body of civil-military scholarship has emerged that is devoted to the study of military dissent, in both autocratic and democratic regimes (Barany, 2016;Albrecht and Ohl, 2016;Brooks, 2022;Droz-Vincent, Chapter 30 in this volume). Often thought to be impregnable to pressures from the inside and from without, some Middle-East dictatorships revealed weaknesses that had lain hidden just below the surface (Bellin, 2012;Pion-Berlin et al, 2014;Bou Nassif, 2021). Doubts about whether the regimes would live up to their end of implicit bargains (e.g., in Egypt), or the marginalization of the military from the spoils of power (as was the case in Tunisia) are just a few of the specific drivers of dissent (Brooks, 2022).…”

“…Doubts about whether the regimes would live up to their end of implicit bargains (e.g., in Egypt), or the marginalization of the military from the spoils of power (as was the case in Tunisia) are just a few of the specific drivers of dissent (Brooks, 2022). Some scholars have disaggregated the armed forces, noting that commanders, fearing that they would lose control over the rank and file, would not issue orders to quell the uprisings when those below them were reluctant to fire their weapons (Lutterbeck, 2013;Bou Nassif, 2021). Other researchers examine varying patterns of dissent and loyalty across Arab states, noting both horizontal and vertical divisions within the ranks (Albrecht and Ohl, 2016).…”

Mobilizing religious differences and terrorism, negotiating civil rights in Egypt

“…Echoing this strategy, Syria's autocratic leader Assad “framed his actions as part of a broader ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaᶜeda affiliated organizations,” Mabon (2020) argues. To survive the uprising, Assad amplified sectarian differences by framing the protests as “a fundamentalist revolt” ignited by the “Sunni Terrorist Jihadis” who, he claimed, were targeting the Alawis and Christians (Bou Nassif, 2021, p. 197). In Egypt, Mubarak's rule positioned Egypt as a “moderate Islamic country” and thus vilified, suppressed, and considered the Muslim Brotherhood its political threat (Maswood & Natarajan, 2012, p. 230).…”

Elite Change without Regime Change: Authoritarian Persistence in Africa and the End of the Cold War

“…On the inside, there is the danger of elite fracture either through coups or defections. From violent suppression of the masses (Nassif 2021) to strategic co-optation of the opposition (Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng 2021), from shuffling (Woldense 2018) to the sharing of spoils to generate loyalty among the elite (Szakonyi 2018), the literature has identified a range of tools that help regimes meet the dual threat to ensure their survival. Yet, when confronted with rare and unprecedented events, even the most robust toolkit will fail to anticipate the newly emerging threats.…”