In July 2013, the Lebanese Shi'a group Hezbollah publically announced its participation in the Syrian Civil War at the battle of al-Qusayr. Long advertized as the protector of Lebanon, many analysts believed involvement in Syria on behalf of Bashar al-Assad's regime would ultimately damage Hezbollah's position at home. Nevertheless, the Party of God has been able to maintain its power in Lebanon. This paper will investigate how Hezbollah is able to autonomously pursue objectives that potentially run contrary to the wishes of its constituents, while still acting as a powerful, domestic political actor in Lebanon. I will first identify why Hezbollah insists on pursuing selfish objectives by considering Hezbollah's weapon supplies. Next, I will show that Hezbollah owes much of its success to its unique relationship with the Lebanese Shi'i. Finally, by examining Hezbollah's media apparatus and international financial and operational networks, I will illustrate how Hezbollah has adapted to trends in globalization to cement itself as one of the most dangerous sub-state organizations in the world.