Heuristics for the facility location and design (1|1)-centroid problem on the plane

Redondo, Juana López; Fernández, José María Pérez; Garcı́a, Inmaculada; Ortigosa, Pilar M.

doi:10.1007/s10589-008-9170-0

Cited by 38 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(45 reference statements)

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“…Continuous models Redondo et al (2010) presented a huff-based model in which the leader wants to set up a single new facility and the follower will react by locating another single facility after the leader locates its own facility. Four heuristics were proposed for this hard-to-solve global optimization problem, namely, a grid search procedure, an alternating method and two evolutionary algorithms.…”

Section: Models With Inelastic Demandmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive location: a state-of-art review

Ashtiani¹

2016

10.5267/j.ijiec

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This paper provides a review on recent works in the field of competitive facility location models based on the following seven components: 1) Variables, 2) Competition type, 3) Solution space, 4) Customer behavior, 5) Demand type, 6) Number of new facilities and 7) Relocation and redesign possibility. First, the components are introduced and then based on these components; different studies are compared with each other via a proposed taxonomy and finally a review on work of each paper is provided.

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Section: Models With Inelastic Demandmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive location: a state-of-art review

Ashtiani¹

2016

10.5267/j.ijiec

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“…They solved this problem using random data sets with a robust evolutionary algorithm. Redondo et al (2010) studied a problem that similar facilities of the follower and the leader are presented in the market and the leader aims to set up a new facility in this planar market. In this problem, the follower will locate another single facility after the leader locates its own facility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving the competitive facility location problem considering the reactions of competitor with a hybrid algorithm including Tabu Search and exact method

Bagherinejad

Niknam

2017

J Ind Eng Int

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In this paper, a leader-follower competitive facility location problem considering the reactions of the competitors is studied. A model for locating new facilities and determining levels of quality for the facilities of the leader firm is proposed. Moreover, changes in the location and quality of existing facilities in a competitive market where a competitor offers the same goods or services are taken into account. The competitor could react by opening new facilities, closing existing ones, and adjusting the quality levels of its existing facilities. The market share, captured by each facility, depends on its distance to customer and its quality that is calculated based on the probabilistic Huff's model. Each firm aims to maximize its profit subject to constraints on quality levels and budget of setting up new facilities. This problem is formulated as a bi-level mixed integer non-linear model. The model is solved using a combination of Tabu Search with an exact method. The performance of the proposed algorithm is compared with an upper bound that is achieved by applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Computational results showed that our algorithm finds near the upper bound solutions in a reasonable time.

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“…an (r | p)-centroid problem. If we now focus on the location-design (1|1)-centroid problem, one can find a Huff-like description in Redondo et al (2010). That paper states that this is a "hard to solve global optimization problem" and does not follow the earlier analytical approach.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On competition in a Stackelberg location-design model with deterministic supplier choice

Hendrix

2015

Ann Oper Res

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We study a market situation where two firms maximize market capture by deciding on the location in the plane and investing in a competing quality against investment cost. Clients choose one of the suppliers; i.e. deterministic supplier choice. To study this situation, a game theoretic model is formulated. We show that for the modelled situation no Nash equilibrium exists. However, a so-called Stackelberg equilibrium, where one of the firms (the leader) is aware of what the other (follower) is going to do, exists. The questions under study is whether co-location is a natural phenomenon in this case and in which situation one of the firms is not entering the market. The study requires a multi-level thinking where the decisions on location follow from the known quality investment behavior and the actions of the leader take the decisions of the follower into account.

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Heuristics for the facility location and design (1|1)-centroid problem on the plane

Abstract: Continuous location, Competition, Centroid problem, Stackelberg problem, Evolutionary algorithms,

Cited by 38 publications

References 25 publications

Competitive location: a state-of-art review

Competitive location: a state-of-art review

Solving the competitive facility location problem considering the reactions of competitor with a hybrid algorithm including Tabu Search and exact method

On competition in a Stackelberg location-design model with deterministic supplier choice

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