Heuristics and Biases

Gilovich, Thomas; Griffin, Dale W.; Kahneman, Daniel

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098

Cited by 1,940 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 1,297 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The conceptualized identified relations may be understood or interpreted by means of guidelines or rules of thumb (heuristics) that may link the observed relations to the requirements that IAS.57 sets out (c.f. Kahneman et al, 1982;Gilovich et al, 2002;Ashton & Ashton, 1995).…”

Section: Methodology and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial Information Related to Dynamic Capabilities - The Corporate Innovation Platform

Schiller

2013

RBM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The purpose of this paper is to suggest an empirically based model for identification, recognition and measurement of internally generated intangible assets (IIAs) that meets the fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful financial information. The paper sets out to empirically test observed relations reflecting new product development activities and their economic consequences in listed companies, by means of personal interviews with senior managers, selected on the basis of their knowledge in the specificities of the innovation process in their firm by means of a phenomenographic analysis the identified relations are conceptualized in terms of logically related categories. There seems to be a match between the identified observed relations and the recognition requirements that International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38.57 sets out, which indicates that the requirements are relevant and information meeting the requirements may faithfully represent what it purports to represent or reasonably can be expected to represent. By relating the recognition and measurement of IIAs to the proposed model the linkage between IIAs and related organizational mechanisms will be made more explicit which may improve the representational faithfulness of the financial information. One of the practical implications of this study is that an entity specific control system based on the recognition criteria presented in paragraph IAS 38.57 can improve the robustness of recognized IIAs arising from innovative activities. By building a bridge between the dynamic capability literature and the accounting literature the paper develops a new model of how to account for IIAs.

show abstract

Section: Methodology and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial Information Related to Dynamic Capabilities - The Corporate Innovation Platform

Schiller

2013

RBM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Is this irrational? A standard for rational choice is that inferences must not violate a condition called coherence (Adam & Reyna, 2005;Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Coherence focuses on structural relations between judgments, based on logic (deductive coherence) or probability theory (probabilistic coherence) and implies a property called invariance.…”

Section: Predicting Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The framing effect has been the most impressive example among a number of irrational effects which come under the heading of "heuristics and biases", or "cognitive illusions" (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). This tradition has successfully-probably more successfully than warranted-exported the idea that human intuitive judgment and decision making is heavily afflicted by irrationality to being widely accepted in the social and economic sciences.…”

Section: Predicting Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predicting Framed Decisions: Simulation or Theory?

Kühberger¹,

Claudia²

2016

PSYCH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When predicting thoughts and behavior of other people, we use either the self as the basis for predictions (i.e., we simulate others), or theoretical knowledge (i.e., we use knowledge about others). To find out whether the prediction of complex choices is possible we asked participants to predict the choice of a well-known or unknown target person in the classic Asian disease framing task, a paradigmatic example of a paradoxical decision. In addition, we collected participants' self-reports on their prediction strategies (theory or simulation). People's choice in a framing task was correctly predicted regardless of familiarity. Although familiarity influenced reported strategy, correct predictions were presumably based on simulation, since explicit theoretical knowledge either was irrelevant or non-existent. These findings show that the correct prediction of paradoxical decisions by high-level simulation cannot be ruled as an alternative to prediction by theory.

show abstract

“…Te "metode" danas zovemo heuristikama. Temeljni zaključak programa istraživa-nja "heuristika i pristranosti" Kahnemana i Tverskog bio je da se ljudi, ograničeni svojim kognitivnim sposobnostima i znanjem, u razmišljanju služe "prečicama" ili heuristikama, ali da nas upravo one navode na pogrešne (ili pristrane) odluke i zaključke (Gilovich, Griffin i Kahneman, 2002).…”

Section: Klasični Model Ekonomske Racionalnostiunclassified

Dvije paradigme objašnjenja kognitivnih pristranosti u odlučivanju: "bihevioralna ekonomija" i "ekološka racionalnost"

Polšek

Bokulić

2013

Drustvena istrazivanja

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

U ovom radu autori navode temeljne ideje dvaju smjerova ili paradigmi istraživanja na području tzv. bihevioralne ekonomije, odnosno istraživanja heuristika i pristranosti. Prva je paradigma (bihevioralna ekonomija) proizašla iz empirijskih nalaza koji su proturječili modelima teorije racionalnog odlučivanja "klasične" ekonomije. Autori pobliže opisuju teoriju racionalnog odlučivanja (TRO) kako bi pokazali osnovne empirijske nalaze i postavke "bihevioralnih ekonomista", ponajprije nobelovca D. Kahnemana i A. Tverskog, prema kojima su ljudi iracionalni kada se "u uvjetima ograničene racionalnosti" služe predvidljivim i vrlo tipičnim pristranostima, odnosno kada se "odmiču" od normi racionalnosti utvrđenih u TRO. Druga paradigma istraživanja heuristika i pristranosti, G. Gigerenzera i njegovih suradnika, pokazuje kako su ljudi opremljeni dovoljno dobrim sredstvima (heuristikama) za brzo i jednostavno odlučivanje, ali dokazuje da se pogreške u odlučivanju, za razliku od tvrdnji bihevioralnih ekonomista, ne pojavljuju zbog "nedovoljnog razmišljanja" i pogrešnoga procesuiranja nego zbog pogrešne primjene danih mentalnih sposobnosti (heuristika) u neadekvatnim situacijama.

show abstract

Heuristics and Biases

Cited by 1,940 publications

References 1,297 publications

Financial Information Related to Dynamic Capabilities - The Corporate Innovation Platform

Financial Information Related to Dynamic Capabilities - The Corporate Innovation Platform

Predicting Framed Decisions: Simulation or Theory?

Dvije paradigme objašnjenja kognitivnih pristranosti u odlučivanju: "bihevioralna ekonomija" i "ekološka racionalnost"

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About