2017
DOI: 10.21034/iwp.3
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Heterogeneous Workers and Federal Income Taxes in a Spatial Equilibrium

Abstract: This paper studies the incidence and efficiency of a progressive income tax in a spatial equilibrium. We use US census data to estimate an empirical spatial equilibrium with heterogeneous workers, landowners, and firms. The US income tax shifts skilled workers out of high-productivity cities, leading to a deadweight loss of 2% of tax revenue. Flattening the tax schedule significantly increases welfare inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and does not increase overall worker welfare, as the efficien… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…The existence of other distortive policies may lead to situations where the number of households living in certain areas is inefficiently high prior to a disaster occurring. This could happen due to, for example, moral hazard resulting from the precedent of generous post‐disaster bailouts (Gregory ()) or the federal income tax code's relatively favorable treatment of less productive places (Albouy (), Colas and Hutchinson ()). Although existing estimates of these distortive effects are relatively small compared to the direct incentives for locating in particular cities and neighborhoods following some disasters, optimal rebuilding grant policies may differ depending on whether or not these other existing distortions are accounted for.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The existence of other distortive policies may lead to situations where the number of households living in certain areas is inefficiently high prior to a disaster occurring. This could happen due to, for example, moral hazard resulting from the precedent of generous post‐disaster bailouts (Gregory ()) or the federal income tax code's relatively favorable treatment of less productive places (Albouy (), Colas and Hutchinson ()). Although existing estimates of these distortive effects are relatively small compared to the direct incentives for locating in particular cities and neighborhoods following some disasters, optimal rebuilding grant policies may differ depending on whether or not these other existing distortions are accounted for.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…66 However, if cities differ in their wage levels, a native's income and tax payments will depend on their location and therefore native migration will imply a fiscal externality. These effects could be jointly analyzed using a spatial equilibrium model with taxes, such as in Colas and Hutchinson (2021).…”
Section: Search Frictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…66 However, if cities differ in their wage levels, a native's income and tax payments will depend on their location and therefore native migration will imply a fiscal externality. These effects could be jointly analyzed using a spatial equilibrium model with taxes, such as in Colas and Hutchinson (2020).…”
Section: Search Frictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%