Heterogeneous Guilt Sensitivities and Incentive Effects

Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Suetens, Sigrid

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3175332

Cited by 17 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Subsequent research should therefore explore how to motivate environmentalists to meet others' initial positive expectations (see e.g. Bellemare, Sebald, & Suetens, 2018). Otherwise, cooperation is likely to break down in repeated encounters when initial positive expectations are not met (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pro-environmental behavior as a signal of cooperativeness: Evidence from a social dilemma experiment (post-print)

Brick¹

2019

Preprint

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Pro-environmental behavior has social signaling value. Previous research suggests that enacting pro-environmental behaviors can signal certain personal characteristics, such as social status and trustworthiness, to others. Using an incentivized experiment, we show that people known to behave pro-environmentally are expected to be more cooperative, are preferred as cooperation partners, and elicit more cooperation from others. The presence of pro-environmental individuals may thus motivate others to exert more effort towards reaching cooperative goals, even in situations where individual and group goals are at odds (i.e., social dilemmas). However, people who behaved pro-environmentally were actually no more cooperative than those performing fewer pro-environmental behaviors.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pro-environmental behavior as a signal of cooperativeness: Evidence from a social dilemma experiment (post-print)

Brick¹

2019

Preprint

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“…Here, evidence for guilt aversion is mixed. While Reuben et al (2009), Bellemare et al (2017aBellemare et al ( & 2017b, and Khalmetski (2016) find evidence in favor of guilt aversion, Vanberg (2008), Ellingsen et al (2010), and Kawagoe & Narits (2014) do not find evidence in favor of guilt aversion. The most compelling explanation of this seemingly ambiguous state of the literature is that the effect of second-order beliefs on action is heterogeneous: Khalmetski et al (2015) find no aggregate effect of second-order beliefs on action.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…They can send any share to their respective recipient, which can be expressed in full Talers. The amount sent is elicited by means of a method akin to a strategy method (Khalmetski et al 2015;Bellemare, Sebald, & Suetens, 2017b).…”

Section: Game Stagementioning

confidence: 99%

The short arm of guilt – An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion

Morell

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill the expectations of others, plays out more strongly if agents share an induced social identity. Participants play a dictator game in which they can condition their amount sent on recipients' beliefs. Dictators either play with a recipient from their own group (ingroup treatment) or from the other group (outgroup treatment). I find that the positive influence of second-order beliefs on how much a dictator sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment. However, the way dictators react to very high expectations does not differ significantly between treatments. In contrast to previous work I do not find that amounts sent are an inversely u-shaped function of recipients' expectations. Rather, and independently of the treatment, participants tend to ignore very high expectations.

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“…18 The use of the menu method is frequent in the experimental literature on guilt aversion (Attanasi et al, 2013;Khalmetski et al, 2015;Balafoutas and Fornwagner, 2017;Hauge, 2016;Bellemare et al, 2017;Bellemare et al, 2018, Dhami et al, 2018. Although one might argue that responses elicited with this method are "cold", this method offers several advantages.…”

Section: Second-order Belief Elicitation and Social Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%