Heterogeneity and the voluntary provision of public goods

Chan, Kenneth S.; Mestelman, Stuart; Moir, Rob; Müller, Rudolf

doi:10.1023/a:1009984414401

Cited by 119 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Our results are also consistent with public good experiments with heterogeneity in endowment, the earnings of the first round of our experiment. Earlier studies found that those who have a high initial endowment, under-contribute relative to their share of wealth, and those with lower endowments over-contribute relative to their share of wealth (Chan et al 1999;Cherry et al 2005). Our results are also consistent with the study of Sutter et al (2005) on institutional choice, where those who invested in rule change are initially more cooperative in resource use.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Effect of rule choice in dynamic interactive spatial commons

et al. 2008

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper uses laboratory experiments to examine the effect of an endogenous rule change from open access to private property as a potential solution to overharvesting in commons dilemmas. A novel, spatial, real-time renewable resource environment was used to investigate whether participants were willing to invest in changing the rules from an open access situation to a private property system. We found that half of the participants invested in creating private property arrangements. Groups who had experienced private property in the second round of the experiment, made different decisions in the Rachel Vilensky recruited the participants. Yajing Wang, Michael Schoon, Tun Myint, Elinor Ostrom, Pamela Jagger, and Frank van Laerhoven assisted Janssen in performing the experiments. Also, many graduate students, staff, and faculty pre-tested the experiments and we thank them for all of their help. Janssen did the data analysis with input from Takao Sasaki. We are appreciative of the excellent comments of two anonymous reviewers.

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Effect of rule choice in dynamic interactive spatial commons

et al. 2008

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Ostrom et al (1994), van Dijk et al (2002), and Cherry et al (2005 find that inequality leads to lower contributions, Chan et al (1996) and Buckley and Croson (2006) report a positive effect, and Chan et al (1999) and Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) no effect. With respect to heterogeneity in the marginal benefit from the public good, Fisher et al (1995) find that individuals with a high marginal benefit contribute more than those with a low marginal benefit.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben

Riedl

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

275

211

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations AbstractEconomic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions increase and differ distinctly across groups and individuals with different induced characteristics. We show econometrically that these differences are not accidentally but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with different characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution norms in an important way.JEL Code: H41, C92, Z13.

show abstract

“…On the other hand, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian predicted that a small redistribution of income -small enough so that the set of contributors to a public good is not changed-would not affect aggregate contributions. Chan et al (1999) test and reject this hypothesis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality

Cárdenas

Stranlund

Willis

2002

Ecological Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A large, but inconclusive, literature addresses how economic heterogeneity affects the use of local resources and local environmental quality. One line of thought, which derives from Nash equilibrium provision of public goods, suggests that in contexts in which individual actions degrade local environmental quality, wealthier people in a community will tend to do more to protect environmental quality. In this paper we report on experiments performed in rural Colombia that were designed to explore the role that economic inequality plays in the 'provision' of local environmental quality. Subjects were asked to decide how much time to devote to collecting firewood from a local forest, which degrades local water quality, and how much to unrelated pursuits. Economic heterogeneity was introduced by varying the private returns to these alternative pursuits. Consistent with the Nash equilibrium prediction, we found that the players with more valuable alternative options put less pressure on local water quality. However, the subjects with less valuable alternative options showed significantly more restraint relative to their pure Nash strategies. Furthermore, they were willing to bear significantly greater opportunity costs to move their groups to outcomes that yielded higher average payoffs and better water quality than the Nash equilibrium outcome.

show abstract

Heterogeneity and the voluntary provision of public goods

Cited by 119 publications

References 18 publications

Effect of rule choice in dynamic interactive spatial commons

Effect of rule choice in dynamic interactive spatial commons

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About