Hermeneutical Injustice, (Self-)Recognition, and Academia

Abstract

Miranda Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and remedies for this injustice are widely debated. This article adds to the existing debate by arguing that theories of recognition can fruitfully contribute to Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and can provide a framework for structural remedy. By pairing Fricker's theory of hermeneutical injustice with theories of recognition, I bring forward a modest claim and a more radical claim. The first concerns a shift in our vocabulary; recognition theory can give a name to the seriousness of the long-term effects of hermeneutical injustice. The second claim is more radical: thinking of hermeneutical injustice as preventing what I call “self-recognition” provides a structural remedy to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice. Because hermeneutical injustice is first and foremost a structural injustice, I contend that every virtue theory of hermeneutical justice should be complemented by structural remedies in terms of recognition. Finally, what I argue sheds light on the seriousness of cases of exclusion of and discrimination against women in academia and helps to draw our attention to new ways to combat such problems.

Epistemic blame

“…But we might wonder whether people can be appropriate targets of epistemic blame for a wider range of actions or attitudes, such as the perpetration of testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007; Maitra, 2010; Polhaus, 2014; Wanderer, 2012, 2017). Moreover, expanding this thought to the intersection of epistemic injustice and political epistemology, we might wonder whether and how epistemic blame can be assigned to individuals or collectives in cases of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007; Hänel, 2020; Jackson, 2019; Medina, 2012; Pohlhaus, 2012). Answers to these questions have the potential to enrich debates about the nature of the harm that attends epistemic injustice, 19 as well as the social dimensions of epistemic responsibility.…”

Who’s to Blame? Hermeneutical Misfire, Forward-Looking Responsibility, and Collective Accountability

“…She might come to doubt her epistemic capacities, her capabilities of making sense of the world, her epistemic self-confidence, and so on. In fact, as I argue elsewhere, not being able to understand significant experiences -such as sexual violence -can seriously restrict one's self-development and identity formation (Hänel 2020). Hence, the secondary epistemic disadvantages that Wood suffers from are deeply problematic and go well beyond the 'mere' lack of understanding a given incident.…”

Citizen Science in Deliberative Systems: Participation, Epistemic Injustice, and Civic Empowerment

“…But from the perspective of deliberative systems, there is indeed a loss, in the sense that it is a missed opportunity for democratic integration and for individuals from different backgrounds to meet each other as equals. Moreover, citizen science projects that mainly attract highly educated white male individuals reproduce stereotypes about who does and does not belong in the social space of science, thereby contributing to the ongoing mechanisms of exclusion in these fields (on stereotype threat, see e.g., Goguen 2016 , on exclusion from academia as a form of epistemic justice, see Hänel 2020 ).…”