In this paper, I discuss a problem for Miranda Fricker's notion of 'hermeneutical injustice'-harm done to a social group by the fact that their culture's shared hermeneutical resources are skewed towards the experiences of its more powerful members. The problem I raise here is revealed when we consider how to remedy these hermeneutical wrongs. Fricker characterizes hermeneutical injustice as involving a lack of concepts. But what has not been properly appreciated in the literature to date is that it is really competing views of the world that are at stake. Fricker's account then seems to imply that the disadvantaged group's understanding of the world (or at least that bit of it, where their understanding is contested by the dominant group, and where that difference in interpretation is harmful to the disadvantaged group) should be treated as authoritative, and taken up by the wider culture. The worry is that, in some cases, the disadvantaged group's view of things is not one that we think should be accepted. Having presented this problem, I will then show that it bears some similarities to another debate: the dispute over feminist critiques of alien cultural practices. I will then argue that lessons drawn from the latter can help overcome the problem of authority in Fricker's case.