Heidegger and the genesis of social ontology: Mitwelt, Mitsein, and the problem of other people

Abstract

This article traces the development of how the early Heidegger tried to integrate the structures of social life into phenomenological ontology. Firstly, I argue that Heidegger's analysis of the three elements of the lifeworld-the withworld (Mitwelt), the environing world (Umwelt), and the selfworld (Selbstwelt)-is ambiguous, because it shifts between defining sociality as a domain of entities and a mode of appearance. This is untenable because the social as a mode of appearance constantly overflows the definition as a domain by implicating social structures in phenomenological explications of entities that, formally, belong to other domains. Secondly, I argue that Heidegger realized this and subsequently changed his terminology from Mitwelt to Mitsein in order to avoid confusing the mode of appearance with the innerworldly entities. The systematic consequence of this line of argument is that the object of social ontology must be the world as such rather than a particular domain.

Okolo's African Being-with and Heidegger's Idea of Mitsein: A Cross-Cultural Dialogue

“…Further, Heidegger does not consider "being-with" as a cultural concept but a social mode of existence which bestows on the human being the status of being-in-the-world. "Being-with", in Heidegger, is necessitated by the human limitations; human insufficiency hence, the human being is condemned to associate with others in order to add essence to his existence [39]. Thus, "being-with" is an existential understanding that characterizes Dasein, it is what Dasein is for the most part; a being already and always with others and can never be lost.…”

Thrown into the World, Attached to Love: On the Forms of World-Sharing and Mourning in Heidegger

“…Hence, Koo's argument only shows that Heidegger's notion of Being-with gives us the minimum necessary condition for any account of the singularity of the other. Knudsen's (2020) meticulous exposition of Heidegger's social ontology can be seen as filling this crucial shortcoming in Koo's argument. Though his argument does not directly concern Heidegger's own construal of the authentic mode of Being-with, Knudsen makes a convincing case for how Heideggerian social ontology can explain the singularity of the other.…”

“…In response to these criticisms, some authors (Agosta, 2010;Derrida, 1993b;Knudsen, 2020Knudsen, , 2023Koo, 2016, McMullin, 2013 argue that Heidegger's category of Being-with is dynamic, that is, referential totalities are not necessarily fixed and course-grained but can allow for the particularity of the other by placing the other within rather fine-grained spaces of possibility. In other words, referential totalities are not mere general interpretative schemes that we apply indiscriminately to token entities; instead, they are responsive to those entities themselves.…”

“…This change in Dasein's understanding of others is crucial for Heidegger's view of authentic Being-with, which I think is not sufficiently addressed and analyzed in the secondary literature. 1616 To mention just some of the most recent studies on this topic, see(McMullin 2013;Knudsen 2020;Thonhauser 2017;Weichold 2017;Stroh 2015). Though McMullin's discussion of Being-with as at once an intraworldly and world-constituting event is very helpful, I do not think that her claim that "the entire Fürsorge continuum involves a being-toward the other qua Dasein"(McMullin 2013, 145, italics in original) is textually well supported.…”