Heidegger and Social Cognition

Gallagher, Shaun; Jacobson, Rebecca Seté

doi:10.1007/978-1-137-00610-3_7

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…First, because of the 'thinness' of the description of Mitsein in Being andTime (1927/1962, section 26). Critics claim that the idea of Mitsein is underdeveloped (Olafson, 1998;Gallagher & Jacobson, 2014). Even Gadamer is in broad agreement with this when he writes: 'Mitsein, for Heidegger was a concession he had to make, but one that he never really got behind (…) it is, in truth, a very week idea of the other' (Gadamer, 2006, p. 23).…”

Section: Mitseinmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dialogue

Henriksen

2023

Jopracon

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Section: Mitseinmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dialogue

Henriksen

2023

Jopracon

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“…In the Heideggerian view, the agent becomes attuned to others in pragmatic situated contexts. As Gallagher and Jacobson (2012) state about the Heideggerian view of Social Cognition: We encounter them [the other] as agents already engaged with us in a meaningful project. Their meanings and our understanding of them are directly tied to the instrumental or social situation in which we encounter them.…”

Section: Philosophical Worldviews In Cognitive Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking situated and embodied social psychology

Pouw

Jong²

2015

Theory & Psychology

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This article aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology (ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social cognition is first and foremost a supraindividual, interactive, and dynamic process (Semin & Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/ Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism) claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999(Barsalou, , 2008 still takes a rather representation-friendly approach that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today. claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999; 2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach, that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today.

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“…At first view Gallagher's understanding of intersubjectivity, as shown in a number of his works, is similar to how Heidegger believes we are being-with and part of das Man (Gallagher 2001(Gallagher , 2004(Gallagher , 2008Gallagher and Jacobson 2012;Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). Whereas the traditional theories of mind, 'theory theory' and 'simulation theory,' state that we infer another person's mental state from the other person's behaviour, turning them into theoretical problems, the 'interaction theory' Gallagher proposes argues that our 'immediate, non-mentalistic mode of interaction' with the world already gives us a sense of how other people think (Gallagher and Jacobson 2012, p. 217-9).…”

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Abstract In this article, I respond to important questions raised by Gallagher and Jacobson (2012) in the field of cognitive science about face-to-face interactions in Heidegger's account of 'intersubjectivity' in Being and Time. They have criticized his account for a lack of attention to primary intersubjectivity, or immediate, face-to-face interactions; he favours, they argue, embodied interactions via objects.

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confidence: 99%

Heidegger’s embodied others: on critiques of the body and ‘intersubjectivity’ in Being and Time

Peters

2018

Phenom Cogn Sci

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In this article, I respond to important questions raised by Gallagher and Jacobson (2012) in the field of cognitive science about face-to-face interactions in Heidegger's account of 'intersubjectivity' in Being and Time. They have criticized his account for a lack of attention to primary intersubjectivity, or immediate, face-to-face interactions; he favours, they argue, embodied interactions via objects. I argue that the same assumption underlies their argument as did earlier critiques of a lack of an account of the body in Heidegger (e.g. Sartre 1989; Krell 1992); namely that because the body is not explicitly discussed in Being and Time, embodiment, rather than stressing the immediacy of experience, is insufficiently acknowledged in his emphasis on 'being-inthe-world'. Through placing Gallagher and Jacobson's accounts of intersubjectivity and the body alongside Heidegger's accounts of Mitsein and Leib, this article shows Heidegger's radical position on the body as immersed in a holistic environment, and its reverberations on his account of intersubjectivity. I argue that Dasein's embodied engagement in the world is always one of immediacy and that the body of the other is perceived as 'tied into' its context, as well. In so doing, I offer an Heideggerian account of ecstatic involvement which moves away from the distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity toward an immediate engagement with objects and people always already 'tied into' a context; an account that, through the concept of Fürsorge, includes shifts of attention between objects and people that allow for the ethical distinctions Gallagher and Jacobson are looking for.

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Heidegger and Social Cognition

Cited by 7 publications

References 37 publications

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Rethinking situated and embodied social psychology

Heidegger’s embodied others: on critiques of the body and ‘intersubjectivity’ in Being and Time

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