Hegel’s practical philosophy

Pippin, Robert B.

doi:10.1017/ccol0521651786.010

Cited by 67 publications

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“…The most obvious place to look for such an individual is in the realm of spirit—indeed, in the discussion of gold I have just referred to, Hegel then identifies spirit as the best example of something with the power to preserve itself in contradiction. Passages like these, which are indeed ubiquitous, have led to interpretations of Hegel that attempt to restrict normative notions to spiritual phenomena, for example, the interpretations defended by Robert Pippin (2008) and Robert Brandom (2009). The prima facie problem with interpretations like these is that Hegel frequently speaks of plants and animals as defective, and this strongly suggests that he thinks normative notions apply to some merely natural beings, as many commentators have noted.…”

Section: Constitutive Norms In Naturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such beings are autonomous only insofar as they act according to laws or norms they impose upon themselves rather than take over from nature. Noting this aspect of Hegel's thought, we might claim, with Robert Pippin and Robert Brandom, that Hegel differs from Kant mainly in adopting a social constructivism about the formation of these self-imposed norms (Pippin 2008: 61; Brandom 2009: 52–77).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…More Kantian readers tend to make spiritual norms sui generis; they claim normativity should be understood as instituted by Geist and conferred onto a natural world that is intrinsically nonnormative. According to this view, norms do not exist at all, whether in nature or spirit, unless they are recognized or treated as norms (Pippin 2008: 60–64).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Hegel's Theory of Normativity

Alznauer¹

2016

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:This essay offers an interpretation of Hegel's theory of normativity according to which normative evaluation is primarily a matter of a thing's answerability to its own constitutive norms. I show that natural and spiritual norms correspond to two different species of normative evaluation for Hegel, two categorically distinct ways something can violate its own constitutive norms. I conclude with some general reflections on the relationship between normativity and ontology in Hegel's system.

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Section: Constitutive Norms In Naturementioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Hegel's Theory of Normativity

Alznauer¹

2016

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…Moreover, the agent would not have executed her intention successfully if her community did not ascribe to her both the act-description and the intention she ascribed to herself. 19 Pippin gives the following helpful illustration of this idea:…”

Section: Hegel: Making Oneself a Reality Through Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normativity and Expressive Agency in Hegel, Nietzsche, and Deleuze

Bowden¹

2015

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy

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This article synthesizes several different studies of Hegel's and Nietzsche's expressive conceptions of action and agency and identifies a related account in Deleuze's Logic of Sense. It argues that such conceptions not only challenge familiar voluntarist accounts of action and agency; they also demand a reassessment of standard approaches to the relation between norms and action. For the voluntarist, an agent's action is caused by the separate, prior intention of the agent. For expressivists, an agent's intention is inseparable from the action expressing it and nonisolatable from the expression of this intention-action in interpretative activity. For the voluntarist, the norms governing action can be thought of as more or less freestanding, entering into the prior formation of the agent's intention. For the expressivist, the norm or principle on which an agent acts will be produced over time, through the unfolding of the action expressing it, as well as through interpretative struggle over the meaning of that action, all of which takes place in a social space governed by more basic norms concerning the offering of actdescriptions, recognition, and social and hermeneutical struggle. A number of important differences among Hegel's, Nietzsche's, and Deleuze's accounts are identified, and their significance is explored.

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“… For two contemporary accounts of the politics of recognition as a reciprocal exchange between humans, see Pippin , chap. 8, and Butler , 5–12. …”

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confidence: 99%