Hegel's Practical Philosophy

Abstract

This fresh and original book argues that the central questions in Hegel's practical philosophy are the central questions in modern accounts of freedom: What is freedom, or what would it be to act freely? Is it possible so to act? And how important is leading a free life? Robert Pippin argues that the core of Hegel's answers is a social theory of agency, the view that agency is not exclusively a matter of the self-relation and self-determination of an individual but requires the right sort of engagement with and recognition by others. Using a detailed analysis of key Hegelian texts, he develops this interpretation to reveal the bearing of Hegel's claims on many contemporary issues, including much-discussed core problems in the liberal democratic tradition. His important study will be valuable for all readers who are interested in Hegel's philosophy and in the modern problems of agency and freedom.

Robert Pippin’s Hegel as an Analytically Approachable Philosopher

“…Only an historical interest could motivate the trouble of attempting to grasp his views. Within the last few decades, however, significant changes within these attitudes have started to occur, and for this issue of Australasian Philosophical Review we have chosen as the topic Robert Pippin's game-changing interpretation of Hegel, developed in a series of books [Pippin 1989[Pippin , 2008[Pippin , 2010[Pippin , 2013[Pippin , 2018a starting thirty years ago with Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness.…”

Rival Versions of Objective Spirit

“…22 For a more complete account of Hegel's criticisms of Rousseau, see Neuhouser (2000). 23 It has become quite common to emphasize the importance of social institutions in Hegel's account of freedom (see, for example, Houlgate 2005, Pippin 2008, Pinkard 2012. But recognizing the incompatibility between the teleological and quasi-transcendental reading requires more than this; it requires noting that rational and moral autonomy depend on institutions in very different senses.…”

Normativity and Expressive Agency in Hegel, Nietzsche, and Deleuze

“…As Pippin argues, "My intention is thus doubly 'real': it is out there 'in' the deed, and the deed is essentially out there 'for others.'" 17 Or again, as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology, the "action is thus only the translation of its individual content into the objective element, in which it is universal and recognized, and it is just the fact that it is recognized that makes the deed a reality." 18 But now, it follows from this that an agent would not be able to unproblematically understand herself to be performing a particular action if her community did not receive it in much the same way.…”