Hegel's Logic as Presuppositionless Science

Hentrup, Miles

doi:10.5840/idstudies2019115107

Cited by 2 publications

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“…William Maker notably defended an account of the Phenomenology as a “self‐eliminating presupposition” for the Logic which suggests itself as a good way to make sense of Hegel's remarks to the effect that the concept of pure being both presupposes an account of finite knowing or consciousness and is at the same time presuppositionless (or mediated and immediate) 14 . Hentrup, on the other hand, argues that pure being can be seen as immediate and mediated, not because it presupposes the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology , but because, after beginning with the immediacy of being, the content of the Logic comes to mediate itself, ultimately turning in a circle and returning to the concept of being at its end (Hentrup, 2019: 151‐155) 15 . I have suggested that the most viable version of Hegel's solution to the problem of beginning occurs in the Encyclopaedia Logic (Dunphy, 2023: 175‐195).…”

Section: Beginning With Pure Beingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 4 More specifically, it appears to be modelled on Sextus Empiricus' discussion of the “two modes” of the later Pyrrhonian Sceptics (Sextus Empiricus, 2000: 43‐44). For discussions of the relationship between Hegel's problem of beginning and Sextus' account of the two modes, see Hentrup, 2019: 151‐153 and Dunphy, 2023: 35‐48, 112‐119. …”

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“…13 13 See Wolff, 1996, 2013: 86‐87, Hentrup, 2019, Dunphy, 2021, 2023: 110‐147. See also Hartnack, 1998: 8‐10, and Xiong, 2022. …”

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The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

Dunphy

2023

Philosophy Compass

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This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel's Logic”: (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel's discussion of the concepts “being”, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel's case for beginning a science of logic with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both “immediate” and “mediated” at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel's treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his “dialectical method” should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel's Science of Logic.

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Section: Beginning With Pure Beingmentioning

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The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

Dunphy

2023

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Hegel and Wittgenstein on Difficulties of Beginning at the Beginning

Mácha

2022

Topoi

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y kinds of entities and orders. First, we can distinguish the subjective and the objective moment of a beginning. We distinguish the agent, the subject, from what they begin, the object. The subject can be any human agent and the object any ordinary thing, e.g. Alice (subject) begins reading a book (object). First, I shall focus on the object. We have to understand the object broadly. It can be a material thing, a piece of knowledge or a chain of reasoning.A beginning is the first element of a certain ordered series. Otherwise, there would be no sense in speaking of a beginning. Various kinds of ordered series provide us with our first classification of beginnings. We can distinguish temporal, spatial, causal, epistemological, ontological, logical and expository series. Distinguishing these series will be the main heuristic framework employed in this essay.The temporal beginning is the beginning of an object's existence in time, i.e. the moment when the object begins to exist. The temporal series can be conceived as natural (causal, mechanical) or historical (spiritual in Hegel's terms). The spatial beginning of an object is its border with another object or with outer space (e.g. my garden begins with a fence). One can take the spatial beginning in a different sense, namely, as the smallest part of which the object is composed, i.e. a kind of atom. The causal beginning is the object's immediate mechanical cause. Given the standard (linear) account of time and causality, the temporal beginning coincides with the causal one. The temporal or causal Vladimir: We could start all over again perhaps. Estragon: That should be easy. Vladimir: It's the start that's difficult. Estragon: You can start from anything. Vladimir: Yes, but we have to decide.

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Hegel's Logic as Presuppositionless Science

Cited by 2 publications

References 7 publications

The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

Hegel and Wittgenstein on Difficulties of Beginning at the Beginning

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