Hedging Against China: Japanese Strategy Towards A Rising Power

Abstract

For more than fifty years, Japan's foreign policy was strongly marked by its defeat by the allied powers in World War II and the beginning of Cold War bipolarity. In addition to becoming an economic superpower and establishing constitutional pacifism as the bedrock of its political system, Japan also became an 'outstanding partner' for the United States. This formula-the so-called Yoshida doctrine-permitted Japan to focus on economic growth and wealth, leaving security matters to the United States. Despite the anomaly that Japan represented during this period of bipolarity, its strategy allowed the country to achieve security and prosperity. However, the Yoshida doctrine was not designed for the uncertain post-Cold War order. Following almost five decades of occupying this "abnormal" place on the world stage, Japan entered a new period in which new challenges have arisen as a consequence of changes in both the international and domestic systems. For Japan, the demise of the bipolar system meant that the Soviet Union was no longer the most significant threat to its security. At the same time, the collapse of the political party system in 1993 had a major impact on Japan's institutional framework, facilitating a more pro-active and assertive global profile. In post-Cold War Japan, therefore, the country's main concerns can be said to be the fear of abandonment and entrapment by the United States, the relative decline of its economy, the ongoing threats posed by North Korea to Japanese territory, and, last but not least, the uncertain rise of China. In particular, the re-emergence of China as a regional and global power has become an issue of special concern in a period of multi-polarity and power transition and Japan's strategy towards the rise of China in the post-Cold War period is significant for several reasons. First of all, although Japan is not the main player that has to deal with the systemic issue of the rise of China, the Japanese reaction to the re-emergence of China will be an essential factor in determining the balance of power in East Asia. The two countries are the most powerful actors in this region and their strategies towards each other have regional and global consequences for the balance of power. In world history, China-as a rising power-and Japan-as a declining

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