Hedge Fund Activism and Internal Capital Markets

Dancing With Activists

“…We hypothesize that settlements are more likely in cases in which the activist has good chances to win board seats should a contested Oostergard, and Schindele (2015); Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2017); Back, Collin-Dufresne, Fos, Li, and Ljungqvist (2018); and Boyson, Ma, and Mooradian (2016). 2 Studies of the subject include Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); Clifford (2008); Zur (2009, 2011); Greenwood and Schor (2009); Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009); Boyson and Mooradian (2011); Cheng, Huang, Li, and Stanfield (2012); Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai (2014); Srinivasan (2014, 2016); Cheng, Huang, and Li (2015); Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015); Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015a); Boyson and Pichler (2019); Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2018); Aslan and Kumar (2016); Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017); Boyson, Ma, and Mooradian (2016); Corum and Levit (2018); Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira (2018); Jiang, Li, and Mei (2018); Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas (2016); Johnson and Swem (2017); Swanson and Young (2017); Bourveau and Schoenfeld (2017); Hege and Zhang (2019); Guo, Utham, and Wang (2019); Kim (2018); and Gantchev, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2019). 3 Some studies have provided insights on the engagement process [see, e.g., Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2018); Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009); …”