Hearts and minds cannot be bought: Ineffective reconstruction in Afghanistan

Abstract

Recent work has suggested the foreign-led reconstruction effort carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq can mitigate violence because it helps win the “hearts and minds” of local people. For the case of Afghanistan, we show there is no evidence behind such an assertion. Analyzing unique data on Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) spending across the country from 2005 to 2009, we find no discernible effect of the reconstruction effort on violence. In light of the absence of empirical evidence for the success of the CERP, we suggest the hearts and minds credo currently guiding U.S. policy be reconsidered. [D74, H56, O1]

Lessons Learned from Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan: A Systematic Review of Existing Research

“…A number of studies (Altai, 2012 (7); Chou, 2012;Child, 2014;Goodhand, 2002;Gordon, 2011;Kapstein and Kathuria, 2012;Nagl, Exum and Humayun, 2009) highlight the intuition that smaller projects can be targeted at important, specific gaps and seem less likely to fuel instability. We note that these small projects are small in the scale of any individual project; the programs which fund such projects may be quite large including in many instances nationwide in scope.…”

“…The one exception was small-scale development aid that was conditional on information sharing by the community; this incentivized approach did appear to be somewhat effective in reducing violence (Chou, 2012). The literature does not provide evidence of increasing returns from a cost-effectiveness perspective; small projects do not have a different impact on outcomes, such as violence or support for the government, relative to larger-scale projects (see Child, 2014). Additionally, Afghans reacted positively to large-scale programs that are populated by small, community driven projects such as NSP because the funding dispersed was too small to be siphoned off by powerful interests while still providing meaningful benefits to communities (Gordon, 2011).…”

“…A handful of other studies, listed below, discuss health outcomes but did not include explicit indicators to evaluate health improvements. A number of studies focused on improvement in health services (AIR, 2013;Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013 (1a); Child, 2014;MSI, 2013 (2)), but contained limited evidence on whether improvements in access were sustained and on the extent to which such access improved actual health outcomes.…”

“…A number of studies (Altai, 2012 (7); Chou, 2012;Child, 2014;Goodhand, 2002;Gordon, 2011;Kapstein and Kathuria, 2012;Nagl, Exum and Humayun, 2009) highlight the intuition that smaller projects can be targeted at important, specific gaps and seem less likely to fuel instability. Small projects have a variety of beneficial features: they are often easier to manage by staff on the ground; they are less likely than large infrastructure projects to attract attention from corrupt officials or to become targets for enemy sabotage; and outputs are small and less likely to become a source of conflict.…”

“…Small projects have a variety of beneficial features: they are often easier to manage by staff on the ground; they are less likely than large infrastructure projects to attract attention from corrupt officials or to become targets for enemy sabotage; and outputs are small and less likely to become a source of conflict. The literature does not provide evidence of increasing returns from a cost-effectiveness perspective: small projects do not appear to have a differential impact on outcomes such as violence or support for the government relative to largerscale projects (see Child, 2014). Additionally, Afghans reacted positively to large-scale programs that are populated by small, community driven projects such as the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program (NSP) at least in part because the funding dispersed was too small to be siphoned off by powerful interests, though it still did provide meaningful benefits to communities (Gordon, 2011).…”