In the continuing debate about the role of the Clinical Ethics
Consultant in performing clinical ethics consultations, it is often assumed
that consultants should operate within ethical and legal standards. Recent
scholarship has focused primarily on clarifying the consultant's role with
respect to the ethical standards that serve as parameters of consulting. In
the following, however, I wish to address the question of how the ethics
consultant should weigh legal standards and, more broadly, how consultants
might weigh authoritative directives, whether legal, institutional, or
professional, against other normative considerations. I argue that
consultants should reject the view that authoritative directives carry
exclusionary reason for actions and, further, ethicists should interpret
directives as lacking any moral weight qua authoritative directive. I then
identify both implications and limitations of this view with respect to the
evolving role of the ethics consultant in an institutional setting, and in
doing so propose the kinds of considerations the ethicist should weigh when
presented with an authoritative directive.