Harman's Hardness Arguments

Millgram, Elijah

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1991.tb00317.x

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Indeed there is a sense in which it is rational for human beings, if only they could find it and follow it. In not denying the rationality of the ideal I stay on the right side of the arguments in Millgram (1991). Millgram argues that there is no best point to draw the line between "hard but required" and "too hard to be required".…”

Section: No Miraclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity

Morton

2004

Nous

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I argue that considerations about computational complexity show that all finite agents need characteristics like those that have been called epistemic virtues. The necessity of these virtues follows in part from the nonexistence of shortcuts, or efficient ways of finding shortcuts, to cognitively expensive routines. It follows that agents must possess the capacities -metavirtues -of developing in advance the cognitive virtues they will need when time and memory are at a premium. keywords: cognition, computational complexity, epistemology, epistemic virtue, metavirtue, virtue. the text as it will appear in Nous appendix one: the naturalness of complexity classes appendix two: proofs notes references sections of the paper:1. the metaresource catch 2. a framework for virtues 3. cognitive complexity 4. few shortcuts 5. no miracles

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Section: No Miraclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity

Morton

2004

Nous

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“…1). SeeMillgram (1991) for a response to Harman also drawing on (approximate inference for) graphical models. Millgram goes further, questioning whether any "hardness argument" could ever cast doubt on the idea that we ought to reason in a way consistent with numerical probability.…”

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Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity

Icard

2015

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Subjective probability plays an increasingly important role in many fields concerned with human cognition and behavior. Yet there have been significant criticisms of the idea that probabilities could actually be represented in the mind. This paper presents and elaborates a view of subjective probability as a kind of sampling propensity associated with internally represented generative models. The resulting view answers to some of the most well known criticisms of subjective probability, and is also supported by empirical work in neuroscience and behavioral psychology. The repercussions of the view for how we conceive of many ordinary instances of subjective probability, and how it relates to more traditional conceptions of subjective probability, are discussed in some detail. * This is a preprint. The final version will appear in Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Thanks to the RoPP editor Paul Egré, to the journal reviewers, and to Falk Lieder for useful comments that helped improve the paper. Thanks also to Wesley Holliday, Shane Steinert-Threlkeld, and my dissertation committee (see Icard 2013) for helpful comments on an earlier version.

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Deliberative coherence

Millgram

Thagard

1996

Synthese

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Harman's Hardness Arguments

Cited by 6 publications

References 4 publications

Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity

Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity

Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity

Deliberative coherence

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