Hardware Dithering: A Run-Time Method for Trojan Neutralization in Wireless Cryptographic ICs

We propose a Hardware Trojan (HT) attack in wireless Integrated Circuits (ICs) that aims at leaking sensitive information within a legitimate transmission. The HT is hidden inside the transmitter modulating the sensitive information into the preamble of each transmitted frame which is used for the synchronization of the transmitter with the receiver. The data leakage does not affect synchronization and is imperceptible by the inconspicuous nominal receiver as it does not incur any performance penalty in the communication. A knowledgeable rogue receiver, however, can recover the data using signal processing that is too expensive and impractical to be used during run-time in nominal receivers. The HT mechanism is designed at circuit-level and is embedded entirely into the digital section of the RF transceiver having a tiny footprint. The proposed HT attack is demonstrated with measurements on a hardware platform. We demonstrate the stealthiness of the attack, i.e., its ability to evade defenses based on testing and run-time monitoring, and the robustness of the attack, i.e., the ability of the rogue receiver to recover the leaked information even under unfavorable channel conditions.

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“…SSCF; ACE; Use hardware dithering as a prevention mechanism [34] . [31] Leaks data using spread spectrum techniques.…”

Section: Refmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, it is possible to design a proactive defense mechanism that challenges the operation principle of the HT with the aim to neutralize it. An example is the hardware dithering technique proposed in [34].…”

Section: Refmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaking Wireless ICs via Hardware Trojan-Infected Synchronization

Diaz-Rizo¹,

Aboushady²,

Stratigopoulos³

2023

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

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“…Literature [27][28][29][30] conducted many similar studies with HTs in the wireless cryptographic ICs and statistical side-channel (power, delay, temperature, current) was proposed for the defense. Some other notable techniques for the study of HT in the wireless cryptographic ICs proposed by researchers are Forward Error Correction (FEC) technique [31], RF Transmission below noise level [32], Hardware dithering technique [33] Information Flow Tracking (IFT) technique [34], self-referencing technique [35][36], etc. The gap in the literature mentioned for the HT in the analog/RF domain so far is that the study is specific to AM/FM modulation scheme which is not very widely used in higher speed wireless communication.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analog hardware trojan design and detection in OFDM based wireless cryptographic ICs

Ali

Farshad

2021

PLoS ONE

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Due to Hardware Trojan (HT), trustworthiness of Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain is a burning issue in Semiconductor Industry nowadays. Over the last decade, extensive research has been carried on HT detection methods for digital circuits. However, the HT issue remains largely unexplored in the domain of Analog Mixed Signal (AMS)/ RF circuit where it is now an appealing target for the attackers. The increasing popularity of Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) based wireless cryptographic ICs in modern communication systems makes it a lucrative target for HT-based attacks which could have a devastating impact on data security. This paper presents a trigger-based Hardware Trojan Threat model that exploits the extended cyclic prefix (ECP) property of the OFDM communication scheme to leak the secret encryption key over low noise Additive White Gaussian Channel (AWGN) and developed a Cyclic Prefix (CP) checker based detection mechanism named “SENTRY” to detect such trojans once it is triggered.

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Runtime hardware Trojan detection by reconfigurable monitoring circuits

Fani

Zamani

2022

J Supercomput

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Hardware Dithering: A Run-Time Method for Trojan Neutralization in Wireless Cryptographic ICs

Cited by 5 publications

References 21 publications

Leaking Wireless ICs via Hardware Trojan-Infected Synchronization

Leaking Wireless ICs via Hardware Trojan-Infected Synchronization

Analog hardware trojan design and detection in OFDM based wireless cryptographic ICs

Runtime hardware Trojan detection by reconfigurable monitoring circuits

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