Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law

Vinx, Lars

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227952.001.0001

Cited by 76 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…But the eye in the visual field is not the eye responsible for the visual field. 54 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) [194][195]. 55 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 111.…”

Section: The Strong Version Of Monism: Logical and Epistemological Nementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a second step, one could therefore take recourse, as suggested by Vinx, to our fictional protagonist, the Kelsenian law-abiding person. 188 The interest of such a person would be to determine what the law requires, and in order to do so, this person must presuppose the Grundnorm to cognize the normative nature of the law. Even an anarchist, according to Kelsen, could describe the law as a system of valid and behaviour-regulating norms without having to approve of this law.…”

Section: Again: the Basic Normmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What is required here is an independent criterion to resolve the issue of identity before the appeal to joint compliance is made. 193 Thus, if we examine the relationship between international and national law, it becomes clear that a practice-based criterion, according to which the observer would simply opt for the validity of that body of law which enjoys a higher degree of effectiveness, would not work to establish the unity of the law. Kelsen himself acknowledges that there are no international lawapplying institutions whose practice of recognition could provide for such a criterion.…”

Section: Again: the Basic Normmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

In Defence of Kelsenian Monism: Countering Hart and Raz

Gragl¹

2016

Jurisprudence

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper discusses the main criticism launched against legal monism and the Pure Theory of Law, as envisaged by Hans Kelsen and the other proponents of the Vienna School of Jurisprudence, namely the criticism voiced by two of the most eminent legal theorists, H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. According to them, legal monism fails to offer a satisfactory theory of the identity of legal systems and it therefore simply cannot be considered a viable theory of legal systems, because it leads to obviously absurd consequences. These arguments which take the form of an attack on the most basic tenets of the Pure Theory of Law and thus legal monism, will be duly addressed and consequently rebutted in this paper, particularly in order to be able to maintain legal monism in its juridicoepistemological manifestation as a working and viable theory of the law.

show abstract

“…But the eye in the visual field is not the eye responsible for the visual field. 54 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) [194][195]. 55 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 111.…”

Section: The Strong Version Of Monism: Logical and Epistemological Nementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Again: the Basic Normmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Again: the Basic Normmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

In Defence of Kelsenian Monism: Countering Hart and Raz

Gragl¹

2016

Jurisprudence

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…115 Alexy argues for a legal grundnorm to include 'content'. 116 He reinterprets Kelsen's basic norm as making a claim to substantive justice with respect to the content of the laws it purports to authorize. The basic norm 'may include moral elements that take the argument of injustice into consideration.…”

Section: Safeguarding the Integrity Of Earth's Life-support Systems Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Operationalizing Sustainable Development: Ecological Integrity as a Grundnorm of International Law

Kim¹,

Bosselmann²

2015

Rev Euro Comp Intl Enviro

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The current process of designing a set of post‐2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) offers an opportunity to clarify the underlying idea of sustainable development. At its core is ecological sustainability, defined as the integrity of Earth's life‐support systems, or ecological integrity in short. This definition is reflective of the science and ethics of planetary boundaries that are referred to in international environmental agreements, and can be formulated as a priority goal in the context of the SDGs. The article argues for developing ecological integrity as a fundamental principle or grundnorm of international law, which is similar to the grundnorm character that human rights or the rule of law have in domestic and international law.

show abstract

“…The issue of whether international law is genuinely a form of law is, admittedly a vexed one, with authoritative figures coming down on both sides (Kelsen 1947;Hart 1983;Raz 1970Raz , 1979Vinx 2007). 10 In a debate over the punishment of war crimes it seems wrong to assume that the question has been settled in the negative.…”

Section: The Problem Of Non-state Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

War Crimes and Expressive Theories of Punishment: Communication or Denunciation?

Wringe

2010

Res Publica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a paper published in 2006, I argued that the best way of defending something like our current practices of punishing war criminals would be to base the justification of this practice on an expressive theory of punishment. I considered two forms that such a justification could take-a 'denunciatory' account, on which the purpose of punishment is supposed to communicate a commitment to certain kinds of standard to individuals other than the criminal and a 'communicative' account, on which the purpose of the punishment is to communicate with the perpetrator, and argued for a denunciatory account which I developed at some length. In this paper I would like to reconsider the plausibility of a communicative account. One difficulty that such accounts face is that the punishment of war criminals often involves the inflicting of harsh treatment on them by individuals who are members of states other than their own. On a communicative account this is problematic: on such an account-or at least on the version of it proposed by Duff (2000)-it is essential that those who are punish and those who punish them belong to a single community. When this requirement is not satisfied harsh treatment does not constitute punishment. Duff has argued that the problem can be solved by regarding all human beings as members of a single moral community: here I argue that this suggestion is unsatisfactory and propose an alternative. One consequence of my account is that if it is correct there may limitations on the range of kinds of war criminal that can legitimately be punished by international tribunals.

show abstract

Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law

Cited by 76 publications

References 0 publications

In Defence of Kelsenian Monism: Countering Hart and Raz

In Defence of Kelsenian Monism: Countering Hart and Raz

Operationalizing Sustainable Development: Ecological Integrity as a Grundnorm of International Law

War Crimes and Expressive Theories of Punishment: Communication or Denunciation?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About