2009
DOI: 10.3182/20090506-3-sf-4003.00002
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Hamiltonian Potential Functions for Differential Games

Abstract: We introduce the concept of Hamiltonian potential function for noncooperative open-loop differential games with n players, n controls and n states, and characterise a sufficient condition for its existence. We also identify a class of games admitting a Hamiltonian potential and provide appropriate examples pertaining to advertising, industrial organization and macroeconomic policy.

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Cited by 10 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…This is the first condition that Dragone [18] states, now confirmed by our analysis. Furthermore, we can establish that the equivalence between the dynamic game and the control problem is related to the existence of a conservative vector field such that the gradient of the potential function:…”
Section: Equivalence Between the Game And The Mocpsupporting
confidence: 82%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This is the first condition that Dragone [18] states, now confirmed by our analysis. Furthermore, we can establish that the equivalence between the dynamic game and the control problem is related to the existence of a conservative vector field such that the gradient of the potential function:…”
Section: Equivalence Between the Game And The Mocpsupporting
confidence: 82%
“…In [16], this scenario is considered and the conditions are presented from a Hamiltonian perspective. More recently, [18] shows rigorously the general procedure for the continuos time model also exploiting the Hamiltonian perspective. Our contribution follows a different approach starting with the proposal of a more general Euler equation (GEE) that is able to represent utility functions in terms of states and actions instead of the reduced form just in terms of states.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If, the social objective of the game coincides with the potential function then we see that the social optimum can be implemented in a noncooperative manner. Dragone et al [22] present some preliminary work towards the extension of potential games in a differential game setting and 15 study games that arise in advertising.…”
Section: Decentralizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in many cases, it is not possible to find such reduced form of the game (i.e., we cannot isolate the action) because the state-transition function is not invertible (e.g., when the state transition function is quadratic in the action variable). The more general case of DPG in nonreduced form was studied with the Pontryagin's maximum principle approach by [5] and [8] for discrete and continuous time models, respectively. However, in all these studies [3]- [8], the games have been analyzed without explicitly considering constraints for the state and action sets.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The more general case of DPG in nonreduced form was studied with the Pontryagin's maximum principle approach by [5] and [8] for discrete and continuous time models, respectively. However, in all these studies [3]- [8], the games have been analyzed without explicitly considering constraints for the state and action sets.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%