Habitual Behavior Is Goal-Driven

Abstract

We address the relation between goal-driven and habitual behaviors. Whereas in recent years the two have been juxtaposed, we suggest that habitual behavior is in fact goal-driven. To support this view, we show that habitual behavior is sensitive to changes in goal properties (reward contingencies), namely goal value and its expectancy of attainment. Whereas adjustment to these properties may be slower for habitual (or overlearned) than for nonhabitual behavior, this is likely due to the routinized (or automatic) nature of such behavior, characterized as it is by reduced attention to its consequences. Furthermore, we show that habitual behavior’s prolonged persistence despite its manifest detachment from the original goal likely stems from its attachment to a different goal. Thus, there is no need to postulate purposeless behavior. The view that habitual behavior is goal-driven offers an integrative account of a considerable body of evidence and is consistent with a functional account of psychological processes.

A critical assessment of the goal replacement hypothesis for habitual behaviour

“…Behavioural and neuroscience research have suggested that reward learning reflects the operation of two distinct neuro-cognitive systems: the goal-directed and habit systems (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010). Recently, this dichotomy has been challenged by authors proposing that, what we thought were habitual responses, are better understood as goal-directed actions (Kruglanski & Szumowska, 2020). This letter is a critical assessment of this hypothesis, which in our opinion can hardly explain the results of recent studies.…”

“…This outcome insensitivity is thought to be achieved by extensive reward training (Tricomi et al, 2009). As Kruglanski & Szumowska (2020) has recently pointed out, there is not much evidence of outcome-insensitive behaviour in humans (see also, de Wit et al, 2018). There are, however, studies in which highly-trained responses persist despite being at odd with ongoing goals (e.g., Neil et al, 2011).…”

“…There are, however, studies in which highly-trained responses persist despite being at odd with ongoing goals (e.g., Neil et al, 2011). For these cases, Kruglanski & Szumowska (2020) and others (De Houwer et al , 2017;Moors et al, 2019; came out with the goal replacement hypothesis: They claim that intrusions of highly-trained responses are not produced by the activation of outcome-insensitive habits but by the activation of alternative goals -also called hidden goals.…”

A critical assessment of the goal replacement hypothesis for habitual behaviour

“…Behavioural and neuroscience research have suggested that reward learning reflects the operation of two distinct neuro-cognitive systems: the goaldirected and habit systems (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010). Recently, this dichotomy has been challenged by authors proposing that, what we thought were habitual responses, are better understood as goal-directed actions (Kruglanski & Szumowska, 2020). This letter is a critical assessment of this hypothesis, which in our opinion can hardly explain the results of recent studies.…”

“…This outcome insensitivity is thought to be achieved by extensive reward training (Tricomi et al, 2009). As Kruglanski & Szumowska (2020) has recently pointed out, D. Luque and S. Molinero XXX 112 there is not much evidence of outcome-insensitive behaviour in humans (see also, de Wit et al, 2018). There are, however, studies in which highly-trained responses persist despite being at odd with ongoing goals (e.g., Neil et al, 2011).…”