Guns, Butter, and Human Rights—The Congressional Politics of U.S. Aid to Egypt

Abstract

In February 2011, the dramatic ouster of Hosni Mubarak threw into the spotlight the U.S. policy of granting generous and unconditional aid to the Egyptian regime at a time when the strategic rationale for such aid had become less obvious and calls for inserting human rights considerations into foreign aid allocations more prominent. Focusing on an unprecedented set of roll call votes taken in the U.S. House of Representatives during the years 2004 to 2007, this article offers the first quantitative assessment of the determinants of Congressional support for U.S. economic and military aid for Egypt. It challenges conventional wisdom on the limited role of campaign contributions in Congressional decision making by highlighting the central role of defense lobby contributions in maintaining the Congressional coalition that shielded Egypt's prerevolutionary regime from increased U.S. pressure in the years leading up to its eventual demise.

International Aid and Democracy Promotion

“…The US has a history of using its aid as a subsidy for its domestic industries, especially in defense and in agriculture (Berger 2012: 607, 611). Such was the value of the Egyptian market -subsidized by US taxpayers in the form of aid -that the oil, agriculture, and defense lobbies developed in order to defend that aid to Egypt (Berger 2012). Berger argued that such lobbies made campaign contributions to US representatives in Congress in return for political support to shield Mubarak's regime from aid conditionality.…”

“…Berger argued that such lobbies made campaign contributions to US representatives in Congress in return for political support to shield Mubarak's regime from aid conditionality. He tested and found evidence for his argument on four significant Congressional roll calls votes from 2004 to 2007 (Berger 2012).…”

Democratic values and the microfoundations of Arab support for peace with Israel

“…As “statist settlements without societal buy-in” (Ripsman, 2011–2012: 433), the only two peace treaties which Israel concluded so far were met with at best lukewarm support from the Egyptian and Jordanian publics who lamented the lack of significant “peace dividends” (Press-Barnathan, 2006; Scham and Lucas, 2003). US military and economic assistance only benefited the supporters of authoritarian rule in both countries (Berger, 2012; Brand, 1999; Henry and Springborg, 2011; Karawan, 1994; Lucas, 2003; Yom, 2009).…”

Human rights shaming through INGOs and foreign aid delivery

“…12 Aid to government channels may be seen as a way to prop up a regime that is having to use repression in the face of increasing domestic opposition (Escribà-Folch, 2010;Licht, 2010;Ritter, 2014 Congressional leaders and government officials have traditionally favored the promotion of leader stability through continued government-to-government assistance to the president (Berger, 2012).…”