Gulliver Unleashed? International Order, Restraint, and The Case of Ancient Athens

Abstract

International relations often include orders of smaller powers led by major powers. Perhaps the most significant aspect of international order is whether the major power leader is restrained or nonrestrained. Restrained major powers respect smaller powers’ preferences, eschew wielding power to impose their preferences, and avoid violating the smaller powers’ sovereignties, often using binding institutions and rules. Nonrestrained major powers violate decision-making rules, seek to impose their preferences, and violate smaller powers’ sovereignties using coercion and force. This article asks, what causes an order to evolve from restrained to nonrestrained? It argues that when a major power grows in strength relative to smaller power order members, the major power becomes more likely to abandon restraint, using coercion and force to impose its preferences on the order. Further, there is a snowball effect, as initial acts of nonrestraint undermine the credibility of the major power's commitment to restraint, encouraging smaller powers to exit the order, fueling further major power nonrestraint. The theory is tested on the fifth-century BCE Athenian order. Athens’ transition from restraint to nonrestraint, what some call a transition from alliance to empire, supports the predictions of the theory. Neither ideology nor rent-seeking theories explain this transition.

Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change: The Signal of Economic Expropriation

“…Beyond security and economic explanations, theories on the causes of FIRC are limited. Owen (2010) developed an ideology-based theory of FIRC, and a few studies make related claims about states imposing regime change to spread ideology, sometimes drawing on ideas from the democratic peace (Reiter 2021). Poznansky (2020; see also O’Rourke 2018) explored the decision to act covertly or overtly once a state has decided to attempt regime change, a choice not examined here.…”

“…11 A few works analyze quantitatively the causes of FIRC during wars (Werner 1996; Bueno de Mesquita, & George, 2006, 440). Owen (2010) offered case studies on FIRC over five centuries, and there are some other political science case studies of the causes of FIRC (e.g., Gibbs 1991; Willard-Foster 2018; Reiter 2009; 2021; Poznansky 2020). O’Rourke (2018) presented something of a hybrid quantitative/qualitative empirical test, generating a comprehensive list of US FIRC attempts during the Cold War and executing careful case studies, though not conducting statistical analyses of the causes of FIRC attempts.…”