Gulf War 4.0: Iran, Saudi Arabia and the complexification of the Persian Gulf equation

Rich, Ben

doi:10.1080/09596410.2012.712453

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Moreover, he stepped up his regionalism plan, boosting the country's political influence. For example, in February 2010, Abdullah proposed that the GCC move towards a confederation, and in June, he invited Jordan and Morocco to join the GCC, expanding the organization's reach (Rich, 2012). While neither materialized, the proposals show intention.…”

Section: The Dependable Variable: a New Grand Strategy Of Regional Le...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It consumed between 7.5% and 8.5% of the GDP throughout the 2000s, reaching a staggering 10.6% in 2014. The kingdom invested in quantitative and qualitative terms, focusing on air and land warfare for defence and offence capabilities (Rich, 2012). It sought a suitable air force as the first line of deterrence and an ‘over-the-horizon reinforcement by the United States to deal with high-level and enduring regional conflicts’ (Richter, 2014: 185).…”

Section: Independent Variable: Saudi Arabia's Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Saudi Arabian strategy reassessment since 2003: The emergence of a regional leadership via Neoclassical Realist lenses

Cerioli

2023

International Area Studies Review

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This article argues that the well-discussed international behaviour change in Saudi Arabia, rather than being a consequence of the so-called Arab Spring, resulted from a grand strategy reassessment in the early 2000s. Grand strategy concerns how states assess the geostrategic environment, plan resource allocation and prioritize policy to meet national interests. Since the 1970s, Riyadh judged its geopolitical vulnerabilities concerning Iran and Iraq realistically, supporting the least threatening actor from the two and relying on the United States to protect the status quo. However, the 2003 Iraqi invasion forced strategy reevaluation, as it removed Baghdad from the power competition, empowering Tehran, Washington and Riyadh. In this new scenario, Saudi Arabia eventually decides on regional leadership as its priority interest, promoting, thus, partial autonomy from Washington and competition with Tehran. By employing Neoclassical Realism, this article argues that the reevaluation was gradual and in continuity with the monarchical logic. For that, it explores Saudi power position and shifts within status satisfaction and inter-monarchical preferences. Empirically, the article aims to demystify the image of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman as something that turned the tables within the leadership, arguing that changes in the country's international relations preceded his rise to power, being linked to King Abdullah. It concludes that, while Saudi Arabian geopolitical goal was clear for outside observers only after 2011, the planning process takes precedence. Theoretically, by providing insight into Saudi Arabia's status-seeking behaviour, its motivations and potential limitations, the article also contributes to discussions about de-Westernizing Realism by incorporating Middle Eastern contextuality.

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Section: The Dependable Variable: a New Grand Strategy Of Regional Le...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Independent Variable: Saudi Arabia's Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Saudi Arabian strategy reassessment since 2003: The emergence of a regional leadership via Neoclassical Realist lenses

Cerioli

2023

International Area Studies Review

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“…The Iranian revolution which overthrew the Shah, on the other hand, was seen as a major development benefiting the anti‐monarchical forces, and one that could disturb the longstanding balance against the forces of change. For Saudis, the new Iranian regime held the same goals as those set by the Shah—to achieve regional hegemony—but this time, they were pursued by far worse measures including delegitimizing the Saudi ruling family and seeking its ultimate overthrow (Rich, , p. 427).…”

Section: Iran and Saudi Arabia: The Question Of Persistent Tensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Iran and Saudi Arabia: Emotionally Constructed Identities and the Question of Persistent Tensions

Soltaninejad¹

2019

Asian Politics and Policy

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The persistence of tensions in Iran—Saudi Arabia relations is the result of negative emotional predispositions that have formed the identities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia vis‐à‐vis each other. The national component of the Iranian identity enforces disinclination towards Saudi Arabia, whereas its religious component is mired in a feeling of pain inherited from mistreatment that the Shi’a have tolerated throughout history. This pain translates into resentment against Saudi Arabia, a state seen as oppressing Shi’a populations. This is aggravated by the feeling of being humiliated by the western powers, with Iran’s emotional perception of Saudi Arabia becoming more negative due to close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the Western great powers. Saudi identity also inherits Arabism’s reluctance to accept Iran. As a result, both countries live in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and fear that explains the persistence of tensions in their relations.

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“…56 The focus of such constructions would shift again to a new emphasis on the Shi'a in 1979 with the decline of Arab nationalist regimes and the rise of revolutionary Iran. 57 Contrasting against the infidelity of the external world, the state continued to claim itself as a bastion of traditionalism, even while overseeing its own rapid modernisation in contradiction to these credentials. As major initiatives began in the 1960s, future monarch Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz stated that '[the] government is fully aware of the need to make serious efforts for the propagation and encouragement of Islam and its protections by words and deeds' 58 and indicated that the regime was committed to '[maintaining] economic and social stability within the existing religious and social framework.'…”

Section: Institutionalisation Cold War Rivals and Further Contradictmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Saudi State as an Identity Racketeer

Rich

MacQueen

2017

Middle East Critique

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Although substantial research has examined the Saudi state's symbiosis with the Islamic revivalist movement commonly known as 'Wahhabism', few studies have considered how the dynamics of state formation underpin this relationship. This article argues that a continuous and circular political logic has sat behind the Saudi state's patronage of the revivalist movement since 1744 and proposes a four-stage model that explains how and why the regime has maintained this support over this prolonged period. This article first outlines this model, then presents a detailed analysis of its persistent presence in the development of Saudi state authority in order to highlight the recurrent manner by which the state often has constructed the spiritual concerns of revivalists to counter challenges to its authority, a pattern demonstrated most recently during the Arab Spring and the war in Yemen. The effects of this model will continue to shape the decisions, policies and perceptions of the Saudi political elite for the foreseeable future.

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Gulf War 4.0: Iran, Saudi Arabia and the complexification of the Persian Gulf equation

Cited by 10 publications

References 4 publications

Saudi Arabian strategy reassessment since 2003: The emergence of a regional leadership via Neoclassical Realist lenses

Saudi Arabian strategy reassessment since 2003: The emergence of a regional leadership via Neoclassical Realist lenses

Iran and Saudi Arabia: Emotionally Constructed Identities and the Question of Persistent Tensions

The Saudi State as an Identity Racketeer

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