Guillaume d'Ockham et la suppositio materialis

Thomas Aquinas and Some Italian Dominicans (Francis of Prato, Georgius Rovegnatinus and Girolamo Savonarola) on Signification and Supposition

“…On Ockham's account of supposition, one can have problems in giving a semantic 2'' See William of Ockham, Summa iogicae, ed. Boehner etaL (1974), 1,65,199,43-57.^' See, e.g.. Spade (1974), Karger (1982), Normore (1997), Read (1999), Panaccio-Perini Santos (2004). For further details on the relationship between signification and supposition in Ockham, see McCord Adams (1976), Loux (1979), Panaccio (1983).…”

Ockham and Buridan on Simple Supposition

“…No such problem occurs, by contrast, in a mental proposition like 'man is an animal': the predicate here being a first-order term, the subject can only be taken in personal supposition.^' Buridan's position in this regard is closely related to Tarski's {and others's) reading of'man' in, e.g., 'man is a three-letter word' as the name ofthe word 'man' rather than as a token of it. For a critical discussion of this Tarskian approach in comparison with the medieval theory of material supposition, see Panaccio (2004b). first two based on the idea that this second-order concept is a mental description of the first-order concept it purports to pick out, while the third one is that it is some sort of mental intuitive grasping of the first-order concept. All of these possibilities raise delicate-and interesting-problems for Buridan's theory.…”