Guide to good practices at plutonium facilities

Faust, L.G.; Brackenbush, L.W.; Carter, L.A.; Endres, G.W.R.; Glenn, R.D.; Jech, J.J.; Selby, Jade; Smith, Ronald C.; Waite, Duncan; Walsh, W.P.

doi:10.2172/7087016

Cited by 4 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…The neutron dose is of great importance in glovebox operations involving kilogram quantities of plutonium (Faust et al 1977). The only type of dosimeter reported in the survey as being used to measure neutron dose to extremities at DOE/DOE contractor facilities is the TLD-albedo dosimeter.…”

Section: Neutron Dosimetersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extremity dosimetry at US Department of Energy facilities

Harty¹,

Reece²,

MacLellan³

1986

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Knowledge of site-specific extremity dosimetry programs is a necessary prerequisite for the identification of feasible alternatives to the upgrading of extremity dosimetry practices. Therefore, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Safety (ONS) initiated a study to review the status of extremity dosimetry programs at DOE and DOE contractor facilities. The study is a result of information obtained during an earlier evaluation of the status of beta dosimetry programs.The objective of this study is to determine the adequacy of present extremity dosimetry programs and identify areas for improvement. This report is based upon the responses provided by DOE contractors throughout the United States.; ; i E. J. Vallario, Leader Health Physics Programs Office of Nuclear Safety U.S. Department of Energy • EXECUTIVE SUM~ARYA personnel dosimetry system must provide an accurate and reliable estimate of absorbed dose. Because extremity monitoring is one of the least well-defined facets of personnel dosimetry, the DOE Office of Nuclear Safety is interested in evaluating and, if necessary, upgrading extremity dosimetry. As part of the initial effort, a questionnaire on extremity dosimetry was distributed to DOE facilities along with a questionnaire on beta dosimetry. An informal telephone survey was conducted as a follow-up survey to answer a few additional questions concerning extremity monitoring practices. The responses to the questionnaire and the telephone survey are summarized in this report.Background information, developed from operational experience and a review of the current literature, is presented as a basis for understanding the information obtained by the survey and questionnaire. The information contained in the background section as well as the survey responses are used as a basis for recommendations for areas of further research and improvement. BACKGROUND INFORMATIONThe background information includes a discussion of regulations and recommendations from advisory groups, extremity dosimeter design and calibration, dosimeter use and placement, and methods used for dose assessment.The current regulations and recommendations specify dose equivalent limits to the hands, feet and forearms, which are different from the whole-body dose equivalent limit. Little guidance exists on the design or calibration of extremity dosimeters, the appropriate placement of extremity dosimeters, or methods of dose assessment.A wide variety of extremity dosimeter designs exists. Many of the extremity dosimeters in use are simple modifications of whole-body dosimeters. However, the critical tissues for radiation damage in the extremity, the composition of the tissues, and the type of damage that may occur differs from that of the whole body. The measurement of beta or neutron radiation to the extremities presents special problems. Because of the shallower penetration of beta radiation, the material above the dosimeter must be thin enough for the v beta radiation to penetrate. Further, the thickness of dosimeter material will...

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Section: Neutron Dosimetersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extremity dosimetry at US Department of Energy facilities

Harty¹,

Reece²,

MacLellan³

1986

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“…The term assumed to be weapons-grade Pu, mostly 239 Pu. Faust et al (1977) indicate that commercial waste will be ~55% 239 Pu, 25% 240 Pu, and 12% 241 Pu with the rest being mostly 238 Pu and 242 Pu. For commercial waste, these values calculate to a dose rate of "'().1 mR/yr with values up to >10 mR/yr possible.…”

Section: Initial Characteristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessment of degradation concerns for spent fuel, high-level wastes, and transuranic wastes in monitored retrievalbe storage

Guenther¹,

Gilbert²,

Slate³

et al. 1984

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors would like to thank the r•lonitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Program office at Pacific i>Jorthwest Laboratory (PNL) for reviewing this report and providing program support. The following PNL personnel are also acknowledged: G. M. Holter, J. F. Fletcher, R. A. Libby, and G. E. Russcher, for fuel inventory data; s. K. Edler, for editorial assistance; and N. J. Wildung for computer graphics.i i i ABSTRACT A study was performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratory to assess potential degradation mechanisms for spent fuel (SF), high-level wastes (HLW), and transuranic wastes (TRUW) under dry storage conditions in a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility. It was concluded that there are no significant degradation mechanisms that could prevent the design, construction, and safe operation of MRS facilities. Long-term mechanisms that could affect the ability to maintain or readily retrieve SF, HLW, and TRUW were identified. v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY It has been concluded that there are no significant degradation mechanisms that could prevent the design, construction, and safe operation of monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities. However, there are some long-term degradation mechanisms that could affect the ability to maintain or readily retrieve spent fuel (SF), high-level wastes (HLW), and transuranic wastes (TRUW) several decades after emplacement. Although catastrophic failures are not anticipated, long-term degradation mechanisms have been identified that could, under certain conditions, cause failure of the SF cladding and/or failure of TRUW storage containers.Stress rupture limits for Zircaloy-clad SF in MRS range from 300 to 440°C, based on limited data. Additional tests on irradiated Zircaloy (3-to 5-year duration) are needed to narrow this uncertainty. Cladding defect sizes could increase in air as a result of fuel density decreases due to oxidation. Oxidation tests (3-to 5-year duration) on SF are also needed to verify oxidation rates in air and to determine temperatures below which monitoring of an inert cover gas would not be required.Few, if any, changes in the physical state of HLW glass or canisters or their performance would occur under projected MRS conditions. The major uncertainty for HLW is in the heat transfer through cracked glass and glass aevitrification above 500°C.

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“…Any changes as a result of alteration in such matters as shipping container loadings were not considered. The calculational methodology used in Section 4 of BNWL-2086, A Guide to Good Practices at Plutonium Facilities (Faust et al 1977}, was used for estimating neutron and gamma dose equivalents. The shielding code PUSHLD (Strode and Van Tuyl 1973) was used to calculate the photon dose rate from cans of powder and pellets, since the complex spectra from plutonium make it impossible to use analytical functions for estimating photon shielding.…”

Section: Cost Estimatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The contact doses depend upon the skill of the operator (speed in completing a job), the operator•s work habits, and adherence to ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) philosophy for reducing dose. The following calculations were based on the plutonium-handling practices outlined in BNWL-2086 (Faust et al 1977) and minimize the time during which quantities of plutonium dioxide are held in the hand. It was further assumed that at least four hours per week are spent cleaning up the glove boxes and that gloves are changed with reasonable frequency.…”

Section: Cost Estimatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first, low-exposure plutonium, is somewhat typical of the material used in PuBe neutron sources in the past. The second is high-exposure plutonium, which is the projected average isotopic composition for all the plutonium to be produced by light water reactors in the United States in the year 1985 (Faust et al 1977). These two isotopic compositions are given in Table 6; the low-exposure plutonium is designated as low exp., and the highexposure plutonium is designated as 85 LWR.…”

Section: Cost Estimatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cost-benefit analysis of unfired PuO/sub 2/ pellets as an alternative plutonium shipping form

Mishima¹,

Brackenbush²,

Libby³

et al. 1983

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A limited cost-benefit evaluation was performed concerning use of unfired plutonium dioxide pellets as a shipping form. Two specific processing operations are required for this use, one to form the pellet (pelletizing) and a second to reconstitute an acceptable powder upon receipt (reconstitution). The direct costs for the pelletizing operation are approximately $208,000 for equipment and its installation and $122 per kg of plutonium processed (based upon a 20-kg plutonium/day facility). The direct costs for reconstitution are approximately $90,000 for equipment and its installation and $81 per kg of plutonium processed. The indirect cost considered was personnel exposure from these operations. Whole body exposures ranged from 0.04 man-rem per 100 kg of low-exposure plutonium reconstituted to 0.9 man-rem per 100 kg of averageexposure plutonium pelletized. Hand exposures were much higher-17 man-rem per 100 kg of low-exposure plutonium reconstituted to 67 man-rem per 100 kg of average plutonium pelletized. The principal benefit is a potential twentyfold reduction of airborne release in the event of an accident. An experimental plan is outlined to fill the data gaps uncovered during this study in the areas of pelletizing and reconstitution process parameters and pellet response behavior to accident-generated stresses. A study to enhance the containment potential of the inner packaging used during shipment is also outlined.

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Guide to good practices at plutonium facilities

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Extremity dosimetry at US Department of Energy facilities

Extremity dosimetry at US Department of Energy facilities

Assessment of degradation concerns for spent fuel, high-level wastes, and transuranic wastes in monitored retrievalbe storage

Cost-benefit analysis of unfired PuO/sub 2/ pellets as an alternative plutonium shipping form

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