Guicciardini and economic (in)equality

Abstract

The article examines several aspects of economic (in)equality in the writings of Francesco Guicciardini. In light of a recent erroneous portrayal of Guicciardini as an advocate of wealthy oligarchs, the article emphasises Guicciardini's appreciation of the Spartan model of economic equality -even if it is unfeasible in the prevailing Florentine circumstances. Guicciardini, seeking to turn the polity towards the pursuit of virtue, argued for measures which would diminish the esteem for wealth in Florence. Nevertheless, Guicciardini was against heavy taxation of the richer citizens: the argument of the "equality of sacrifice" in taxation (which Guicciardini himself first formulated in writing), and the nuanced answer on this point, which he offers to the proponents of progressive taxation, are examined. The article seeks to explain the prima facie contradiction between Guicciardini's reverence for the Spartan system and his 'proto-libertarian' defence of accumulated property, and the rights of the better-off citizens against expropriation. In both cases, it is argued, Guicciardini's position is determined by his concern for virtue and the conditions favourable to its pursuit. The article stresses complexity of Guicciardini's views.

Machiavelli and Spartan Equality

“…35 Guicciardini's La Decima scalata demonstrates the impossibility of applying Lycurgus' scalpel to Florence, because, as he points out, the city does not have a citizen army and thus depends on mercenaries, whose enormous cost can only be supported by aristocratic wealth. This, according to Regent (2020), proves not only Guicciardini's moderation but also his lucidity and realism in economic matters, which Machiavelli in contrast lacks because of his radicalism and insufficient realism. 36 Moreover, Guicciardini would not be the 'advocate of wealthy "oligarchs"', as claimed by scholars like John McCormick (2011), who Regent accuses of turning things upside down, or, as he writes, 'puts things on their heads' (2020: 54): as the Discorso shows, Guicciardini would not defend wealth in itself, but rather the individual virtue; to use a modern term, he promotes meritocracy (see Guicciardini 1857Guicciardini -1867.…”

Quentin Skinner, contextual method and Machiavelli's understanding of liberty

“…While McCormick is often warranted when he argues that Skinner is overemphasising continuity between Machiavelli and the preceding republican tradition, and is right to point out Skinner's 'apologetically inclined' efforts to lessen Machiavelli's radicalism and emphasis on violence (2018: 10), overall, his interpretation is not an improvement over Skinner's. As I put it in Regent (2020a: 62, n. 67), 'McCormick (2011 uses both self-interest and individual rights. …to meditate on the potential relevance of a theory which tells us that, if we wish to maximise our own individual liberty, we must cease to put our trust in princes and instead take charge of the public arena ourselves.'…”

“…While McCormick is often warranted when he argues that Skinner is overemphasising continuity between Machiavelli and the preceding republican tradition, and is right to point out Skinner's ‘apologetically inclined’ efforts to lessen Machiavelli's radicalism and emphasis on violence (2018: 10), overall, his interpretation is not an improvement over Skinner's. As I put it in Regent (2020a: 62, n. 67), ‘McCormick (2011) uses both Machiavelli and Guicciardini as pawns to advance a certain contemporary political agenda; the book is an exceedingly biased attempt… which disregards and/or misinterprets facts which do not support the author's grand thesis’. It is outside the scope of this article to engage in detailed criticism of McCormick's interpretation of Machiavelli; however, cf.…”

“…(Guicciardini is in McCormick [2011: 195, n. 26] discussed in pair with, and used as an oligarchical ‘foil’ for, Machiavelli; he is actually the ‘real' republican, key to the tradition, not Machiavelli – thus ‘Cambridge School's “Guicciardinian Moments”'. For a thorough criticism see Regent [2020a: 51, 54, 62, esp. 54, n. 23 and 62, nn.…”