Guaranteeing user welfare in network service

Yu, Seung Min; Kim, Seong-Lyun

doi:10.1145/2381056.2381062

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 8 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…The regulator's key concern is to improve user welfare [15], [16]. User welfare means the sum of all users' utilities.…”

Section: B Role Of the Regulatormentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-Theoretic Understanding of Price Dynamics in Mobile Communication Services

Kim

2014

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

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Abstract-In the mobile communication services, users wish to subscribe to high quality service with a low price level, which leads to competition between mobile network operators (MNOs). The MNOs compete with each other by service prices after deciding the extent of investment to improve quality of service (QoS). Unfortunately, the theoretic backgrounds of price dynamics are not known to us, and as a result, effective network planning and regulative actions are hard to make in the competitive market. To explain this competition more detail, we formulate and solve an optimization problem applying the two-stage Cournot and Bertrand competition model. Consequently, we derive a price dynamics that the MNOs increase and decrease their service prices periodically, which completely explains the subsidy dynamics in the real world. Moving forward, to avoid this instability and inefficiency, we suggest a simple regulation rule which leads to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium point. Moreover, we suggest regulator's optimal actions corresponding to user welfare and the regulator's revenue.

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“…The regulator's key concern is to improve user welfare [15], [16]. User welfare means the sum of all users' utilities.…”

Section: B Role Of the Regulatormentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-Theoretic Understanding of Price Dynamics in Mobile Communication Services

Kim

2014

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

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“…In [6], various possible regulation methods are analyzed by the existence of neutral operators. The price and QoS subsidy schemes are introduced for guaranteeing user welfare in [7]. However, the existing literatures do not fully address MNO's leasing strategies that are tightly related with pricing strategies and profit maximization.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Utility-Optimal Partial Spectrum Leasing for Future Wireless Services

Jung

Kim

2013

2013 IEEE 77th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring)

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One of the challenges facing the next-generation wireless networks is to cope with the expected demand for data. This calls for an efficient spectrum regulation that can enable mobile subscribers to support high quality of service (QoS) and mobile network operators (MNOs) to leverage their profit streams. In this paper, we present a new spectrum allocation policy in a monopoly situation. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. We show that the conventional spectrum leasing contract may lead to the unprecedented scenario in which costs outweigh their revenues. On the other hand, our proposed spectrum leasing contract can not only maximize user welfare but also leverage MNO's profit streams. We show that our spectrum leasing contract can increase user welfare and MNO's profit up to 75% and 20%, respectively, relative to the conventional spectrum leasing contract. Thus, regulators must rewrite their spectrum allocation policy in order to maximize user welfare and leverage MNO's profit streams.

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“…Thus, the providers will be offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially at different locations, but will be asked to cover users not subscribed to them so as to maintain their subsidy incentives from the government. Recent studies suggest significant market and user welfare gains under such subsidization, e.g., data subsidy for offering minimal data plan to users for free [14] or spectrum pooling among providers to improve user experience [10]. However, using game theory to analyze a subsidized spectrum market, that considers spatial and temporal providergovernment relationships as well as dynamic components like roaming, and signal quality, is essentially unexplored.…”

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confidence: 99%