Guaranteeing Spoof-Resilient Multi-Robot Networks

Gil, Stephanie; Kumar, Swarun; Mazumder, Mark; Katabi, Dina; Rus, Daniela

doi:10.15607/rss.2015.xi.020

Cited by 34 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The communications vulnerabilities of the robotics system that were raised in earlier papers can be mitigated using ROS 2 with DDS security; however, this is only a part of developing a secure robotic system. [39][40][41] We note that future work can be done to address the overall security of robotic systems. ROS 2 security is a start, but as shown from a holistic point of view many levels remain exposed.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robot Operating System 2

DiLuoffo

Michalson

Sunar

2018

International Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems

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It is no secret that robotic systems are expanding into many human roles or are augmenting human roles. The Robot Operating System is an open-source standard for the robotic industry that enables locomotion, manipulation, navigation, and recognition tasks by integrating sensors, motors, and controllers into reusable modules over a distributed messaging architecture. As reliance on robotic systems increases, these systems become high value targets, for example, in autonomous vehicles where human life is at risk. As Robot Operating System has become a de facto standard for many robotic systems, the security of Robot Operating System becomes an important consideration for deployed systems. The original Robot Operating System implementations were not designed to mitigate the security risks associated with hostile actors. Robot Operating System 2, the next generation of the Robot Operating System, addresses this shortcoming, leveraging Data Distributed Services for its messaging architecture and Data Distributed Services security extension for its data protection in motion. This article provides a systematic review of Robot Operating System 2 and identifies potential risks for this new robotic system paradigm. A Robot Operating System 2 robotic system is viewed as a series of layers from the hardware that include sensors, motors, and controllers to the software layers, which include the operating system, security services, protocols, messaging, and the cognitive layer for observation, learning, and action. Since Robot Operating System 2 and security are new considerations for robotics systems as they move into mainstream, many questions emerge. For example, can some portions be secure and other portions be non-secure? Does everything need to be secure? What are the trade-offs between, security, performance, latency and throughput? What about real-time robotic systems? This article provides an overview of the Robot Operating System 2 paradigm and represents a first step toward answering these questions.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robot Operating System 2

DiLuoffo

Michalson

Sunar

2018

International Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems

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“…More recently, approaches that leverage the physics of the environment to counter cyberattacks began to emerge. In [8], the authors propose an algorithm that uses the physics of wireless signals to defend against Sybil attacks in multi-robot networks. In [25], the authors propose a Sybil attack-resilient traffic estimation and routing algorithm that uses information from sensing infrastructure and the dynamics and proximities of vehicles.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We show that our method can find a multi-agent plan with the guaranteed resilience (if one exists) under a strong attacker model where an agent is completely compromised and has full knowledge of the plan. Our work is inspired by the recent efforts on defending against Sybil or spoofing attacks in multirobot systems [8], [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resilience of Multi-robot Systems to Physical Masquerade Attacks

Wardega

Tron

2019

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)

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The advent of autonomous mobile multi-robot systems has driven innovation in both the industrial and defense sectors. The integration of such systems in safety-and securitycritical applications has raised concern over their resilience to attack. In this work, we investigate the security problem of a stealthy adversary masquerading as a properly functioning agent. We show that conventional multi-agent pathfinding solutions are vulnerable to these physical masquerade attacks. Furthermore, we provide a constraint-based formulation of multi-agent pathfinding that yields multi-agent plans that are provably resilient to physical masquerade attacks. This formalization leverages inter-agent observations to facilitate introspective monitoring to guarantee resilience.

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“…Recently, in the context of multi-robot coordination, the authors in [27], [28] propose methods to tackle the so called "Sybil attack", where an attacker spoofs or impersonates the identities of existing agents to gain a disproportionate advantage in the network. The methods developed in [27], [28] are based on analyzing the physics of wireless signals. Since such signals are invariably corrupted by environment and channel noise, the guarantees in [27], [28] are of a probabilistic nature.…”

Section: Resilient Distributed State Estimation Under Monochromatimentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Impact of Trusted Nodes in Resilient Distributed State Estimation of LTI Systems

Mitra

Abbas

Sundaram

2018

2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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We address the problem of distributed state estimation of a linear dynamical process in an attack-prone environment. Recent attempts to solve this problem impose stringent redundancy requirements on the measurement and communication resources of the network. In this paper, we take a step towards alleviating such strict requirements by exploring two complementary directions: (i) making a small subset of the nodes immune to attacks, or "trusted", and (ii) incorporating diversity into the network. We define graph-theoretic constructs that formally capture the notions of redundancy, diversity, and trust. Based on these constructs, we develop a resilient estimation algorithm and demonstrate that even relatively sparse networks that either exhibit node-diversity, or contain a small subset of trusted nodes, can be just as resilient to adversarial attacks as more dense networks. Finally, given a finite budget for network design, we focus on characterizing the complexity of (i) selecting a set of trusted nodes, and (ii) allocating diversity, so as to achieve a desired level of robustness. We establish that, unfortunately, each of these problems is NP-complete. arXiv:2001.07056v1 [eess.SY]

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Guaranteeing Spoof-Resilient Multi-Robot Networks

Cited by 34 publications

References 15 publications

Robot Operating System 2

Robot Operating System 2

Resilience of Multi-robot Systems to Physical Masquerade Attacks

On the Impact of Trusted Nodes in Resilient Distributed State Estimation of LTI Systems

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