Growth in European Crisis Countries: Cyclical Normality or the Result of Structural Reforms?

Hielscher, Kai

doi:10.1515/roe-2015-1009

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Schäfer (2010) argues that in particular this can take place if political cartels exist and hence political competition is limited. In addition, Hielscher (2016) Merville and Osborne (1990, 40) come the conclusion that the U.S. Constitution can be seen as a "poor agency contract" and see political agents as either risk averse or risk neutral. If the risk appetite of politicians (and bureaucrats) turns out to be smaller than the risk appetite of the voter, this could lead to reluctance for reform from the voter's perspective.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reluctant to Reform? A Note on Risk-Loving Politicians and Bureaucrats

Thomas¹,

Heß

Wagner

2017

Review of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractFrom a political economy perspective, politicians often fail to implement structural reforms. In this contribution we investigate if the resistance to reform is based on the differences in the risk preferences of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. Based on three surveys among the German electorate, 175 members of the Federal German Parliament and 106 officials from German ministries, this is not the case. Since both politicians and bureaucrats have a higher risk appetite than the voters, their risk preferences cannot be seen as an explanation for the resistance to structural reform. Hence, it must be caused by other reasons. These could be interventions by veto players, wars of attrition by powerful interest groups, or reform logjams initiated. However, as during times of populist campaigns, the election process can put forth candidates with very high risk appetites, the constitutions of democracies turn out to be rather smart if hazardous actions and measures by political rookies and gamblers are inhibited by checks and balances. JEL: D71, D78, H11, H70, P16, Z13

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reluctant to Reform? A Note on Risk-Loving Politicians and Bureaucrats

Thomas¹,

Heß

Wagner

2017

Review of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Schäfer (2010) argues that in particular this can take place if political cartels exist and hence political competition is limited. In addition, Hielscher (2016) empirically analyses that economic gains derived from structural reforms are sometimes questionable.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%