Growing centralization in China’s farmland protection policy in response to policy failure and related upward-extending unwillingness to protect farmland since 1978

Abstract

Since 1978, China has experienced a rapid loss of arable land, leading to centralizing of farmland protection policies. To understand the growing centralization, this paper has used the lens of the interactions among (1) unwillingness to protect farmland among diverse actors, (2) policy failure and (3) policy change. The growing centralization is an adaptive response to the unwillingness to protect farmland from local up to provincial government levels, and its associated policy failure. The article suggests that gradual centralization over the last almost 40 years has gone through three phases: centralization to county-level, centralization to provincial-level, and intensifying technical supervision from central government. In the first phase, the unwillingness to preserve farmland appeared at the levels of the rural household, village and township; in the second phase, county- and prefecture-level governments began to lose willingness to preserve farmland; and, in the third phase, provincial governments’ willingness to preserve farmland weakened. The current centralized system has succeeded, for the most part, in addressing the problem of asymmetric information about farmland preservation between central and local governments, but the basic planning problem regarding loss of farmland remains a challenge.

State Intervention in Land Supply and Its Impact on Real Estate Investment in China: Evidence from Prefecture-Level Cities

“…The state holds substantial control over urban land supply for real estate development, making land supply a critical tool of the state in shaping real estate investment and urban development [8]. Given its multiple roles in the land market, the state can shape urban land supply through a variety of means such as land use policies and regulations (e.g., references [7,[29][30][31][32]), direct investment in land development (e.g., references [33][34][35]), urban and regional planning (e.g., references [36][37][38][39]), and land leasing (e.g., references [22,40]). The impact of the central state's intervention in land supply on municipal levels in China warrants a proper comprehension of the central-local relations in land supply.…”

“…The entrepreneurial nature of the local state [39] has meant that it is not a disinterested regulatory third party with regards to land and economic development. Although the central state has gradually strengthened its regulatory power in land supply since the late 1990s [31,46], its rules and regulations (e.g., land use quotas) have often been circumvented or violated by the local state in order to pursue growth [32].…”

Impacts of Urbanization and Associated Factors on Ecosystem Services in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Urban Agglomeration, China: Implications for Land Use Policy

“…With the aim of identifying implications and recommendations in land-use policies, some policy suggestions are put forward by integrating our findings and the development targets of the BTH. On the one hand, greater efforts to control urban sprawl by strictly limiting the transformation of cultivated land to land for construction purposes is needed [61]. We propose that careful selection of new urban land siting may limit the loss of ESs based on a reliable land program.…”

Design of Aerial Panoramic Photography: Contrast between Industrialized and Natural Zones

“…Although laws related to environmental protection have been enacted, the conversion of farmland into industrial zones has not abated. Although institutions have attempted to preserve cultivated land [1], recent manifestation of environmental problems indicates that development policies require reform. The education of citizens regarding environmental protection is crucial for the development of sustainability-related social consciousness.…”