Groups Defined by Gender and the Genocide Convention

Abstract

This article explores the crime of genocide in connectivity to groups defined by gender. Its aim is to investigate whether including groups defined by gender as a protected group in the Genocide Convention appears legally plausible. It begins by probing the historical origins of the concept of genocide. This exposition emanates into an analytical examination of the rationale of protecting human groups in international criminal law. Against this background, the article advocates an understanding of the crime of genocide as a rights-implementing institute. Subsequently, it employs an ejusdem generis analysis to assess whether groups defined by gender are coherent with the current canon of the protected groups, and if similar treatment thereby can be warranted. It then turns to examine other international law instruments, to expose that none of these are suitable proxies in dealing with gender-specific genocides. From this perspective, the article suggests that the content of the crime of genocide is not determinate, but rather emerges as a battlefield for hegemonic interests. Hence, it is easily discernible that the way in which the current construction of the protected groups in the Genocide Convention relates to gender groups reflects a deliberate choice. The article concludes with asserting that the choice represents a lacuna in international criminal law that in the end compromises the legitimacy of the crime of genocide, since the personal scope of the crime of genocide risks being in discord with current social and political trajectories.

The International Criminal Trial as a Site for Contesting Historical and Political Narratives: The Case of Dominic Ongwen

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“…This is because the moment international criminal law steps into the arena of evaluating broader contextual matters, it moves into a realm of conflict, where there exists a plurality of ‘truths’. The mere political dimension is not necessarily negative as such, but there is reason to be wary of interests that are accepted as ‘neutral’ as a consequence (Strandberg Hassellind, 2020: 72).…”

1971 Killing of the ‘Bengali’ Intellectuals: An Analysis from the Perspective of the 1948 Genocide Convention

“…46 Lemkin's idea was to save the 'human groups' from genocide. 47 In his writings, he referred to other groups of victims, for example, Poles, Gypsies and others who were targeted during WWII. 48 His priority was to save the victim groups from the perspective of perpetrators, who attacked the individuals for belonging to any particular group.…”