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2013
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2298909
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Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony

Abstract: A fundamental divide exists between what scientists do as scientists and what courts often ask them to do as expert witnesses. Whereas scientists almost invariably inquire into phenomena at the group level, trial courts typically need to resolve cases at the individual level. In short, scientists generalize while courts particularize. A basic challenge for trial courts that rely on scientific experts, therefore, concerns determining whether and how scientific knowledge derived from studying t JohnThe Universit… Show more

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Cited by 84 publications
(142 citation statements)
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“…In routine correctional practice, decisions concerning the credibility of risk assessment procedures are typically the responsibility of central administrators who set standardized policy concerning the use and interpretation of risk tools. In forensic psychology and psychiatry, however, the expert witness typically has the dual responsibility of providing opinions concerning the case at hand and defending the broad scientific background on which these opinions are based (Faigman, Monahan, & Slobogin, 2014). Consequently, even if an expert witness uses a mechanical risk assessment tool, the professional opinions proffered by the expert should not be mechanical.…”
Section: Concluding Commentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In routine correctional practice, decisions concerning the credibility of risk assessment procedures are typically the responsibility of central administrators who set standardized policy concerning the use and interpretation of risk tools. In forensic psychology and psychiatry, however, the expert witness typically has the dual responsibility of providing opinions concerning the case at hand and defending the broad scientific background on which these opinions are based (Faigman, Monahan, & Slobogin, 2014). Consequently, even if an expert witness uses a mechanical risk assessment tool, the professional opinions proffered by the expert should not be mechanical.…”
Section: Concluding Commentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Often this will involve information about general, or indicative, error rates and practical limitations. As in the diagnostic model, much of the information (i.e., scientific evidence) that can be presented will be based on general data from previous studies (i.e., from beyond the instant case) and the legal participants and fact-finder must reason and make inferences from the general to the particular case (Faigman, Monahan, & Slobogin, 2013).…”
Section: Insights From Medicine: the Diagnostic Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, although the MAOA×childhood maltreatment evidence has been replicated several times,15 it is unclear how statistical group differences from large samples can be applied to individual cases16 (for a review, see ref. 17). …”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%