Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

Xu, Bin; Cadsby, Charles Bram; Fan, Liangcong; Song, Fei

doi:10.3390/g4010089

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Explanations of size effects in public goods games generally fall into two categories. One category draws on the incentive or payoff structure, that is characteristics of the dilemma [ 4 – 6 ], whereas the other category draws on other social psychological factors such as self-efficacy [ 7 ], norm-enforcement [ 8 ], monitoring [ 9 ], punishment [ 10 ] and framing [ 11 ]. We explore the both types of explanations for the effect of size, proposing that, psychologically, people may reason from both an individual and group perspective and that this reasoning clarifies why different payoff structures have produced the size dilemma.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilemma of Dilemmas: How Collective and Individual Perspectives Can Clarify the Size Dilemma in Voluntary Linear Public Goods Dilemmas

et al. 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Empirical findings on public goods dilemmas indicate an unresolved dilemma: that increasing size—the number of people in the dilemma—sometimes increases, decreases, or does not influence cooperation. We clarify this dilemma by first classifying public goods dilemma properties that specify individual outcomes as individual properties (e.g., Marginal Per Capita Return) and group outcomes as group properties (e.g., public good multiplier), mathematically showing how only one set of properties can remain constant as the dilemma size increases. Underpinning decision-making regarding individual and group properties, we propose that individuals are motivated by both individual and group preferences based on a theory of collective rationality. We use Van Lange's integrated model of social value orientations to operationalize these preferences as an amalgamation of outcomes for self, outcomes for others, and equality of outcomes. Based on this model, we then predict how the public good's benefit and size, combined with controlling individual versus group properties, produce different levels of cooperation in public goods dilemmas. A two (low vs. high benefit) by three (2-person baseline vs. 5-person holding constant individual properties vs. 5-person holding constant group properties) factorial experiment (group n = 99; participant n = 390) confirms our hypotheses. The results indicate that when holding constant group properties, size decreases cooperation. Yet when holding constant individual properties, size increases cooperation when benefit is low and does not affect cooperation when benefit is high. Using agent-based simulations of individual and group preferences vis-à-vis the integrative model, we fit a weighted simulation model to the empirical data. This fitted model is sufficient to reproduce the empirical results, but only when both individual (self-interest) and group (other-interest and equality) preference are included. Our research contributes to understanding how people's motivations and behaviors within public goods dilemmas interact with the properties of the dilemma to lead to collective outcomes.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilemma of Dilemmas: How Collective and Individual Perspectives Can Clarify the Size Dilemma in Voluntary Linear Public Goods Dilemmas

et al. 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…So far, there is only limited experimental evidence on contribution behavior from PGG under conditions of very low MPCR (Weimann et al, 2012). While some general patterns persist, there is also some emerging evidence that well known mechanisms for fostering cooperation such as peer-punishment (Xu et al, 2013) are much less effective given a reduced MPCR. Further research in this direction could be of great interest for those who wish to study the behavioral mechanisms of cooperation in the context of climate change.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Do We Learn from Public Good Games About Voluntary Climate Action? Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment

et al. 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractEvidence from public good game experiments holds the promise of instructive and costeffective insights to inform environmental policy-making, for example on climate change mitigation. To fulfill the promise, such evidence needs to demonstrate generalizability to the specific policy context. This paper examines whether and under which conditions such evidence generalizes to voluntary mitigation decisions. We observe each participant in two different decision tasks: a real giving task in which contributions are used to directly reduce CO2 emissions and a public good game. Through two treatment variations, we explore two potential shifters of generalizability in a within-subjects design: the structural resemblance of contribution incentives between the tasks and the role of the subject pool, students and non-students. Our findings suggest that cooperation in public good games is linked to voluntary mitigation behavior, albeit not in a uniform way. For a standard set of parameters, behavior in both tasks is uncorrelated. Greater structural resemblance of the public goods game leads to sizable correlations, especially for student subjects.

show abstract

“…However, empirical research on these two mechanisms is mainly limited to relatively small groups (e.g., Milinski et al, 2002) and does not address how reputation and punishment enhance cooperation in larger groups. In fact, there is scant empirical evidence from behavioral experiments about their effectiveness in groups of different sizes (for one exception in the context of punishment, see Xu et al, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Using a one-shot public goods game, we first examine how cooperation varies with the number of group members (Study 1), and then move on to testing predictions on the roles of reputation and punishment across different group sizes (Study 2). Based on previous work (Isaac et al, 1994;Xu et al, 2013), we used groups of 4, 20, and 40 to represent relatively small, medium, and large groups. Study 1 initially tested the hypothesized group size effect when temptation (i.e., fixed MGR) or gain (i.e., fixed MPCR) increased with group size.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Balliet

Peperkoorn

et al. 2020

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Reputation and punishment are two distinct mechanisms that facilitate cooperation among strangers. However, empirical research on their effectiveness is mainly limited to relatively small groups and does not address how they enhance cooperation in relatively larger groups. We address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses from competing perspectives about the extent to which reputation-based partner choice and punishment enhance cooperation in both small and large groups. Prior work recognizes that an increase in group size is accompanied by a change in the incentive structure, which determines whether the temptation (extra benefit for each person from noncooperation over cooperation, regardless of others' choices) or gain (extra benefit for each person from full cooperation over full non-cooperation) remains constant or varies with group size. Thus, we first test how group size affects cooperation when temptation or gain increases with group size (Study 1), and then move on to testing predictions on the effectiveness of reputation and punishment across different group sizes (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 820), we randomly assigned participants to play an online one-shot public goods game in groups of 4, 20, or 40, while keeping the marginal group return or marginal per capita return fixed across groups, in which case the temptation or gain increased with group size. In Study 2 (N = 1,132), we further compared a public goods situation involving a punishment or reputation mechanism with an anonymous situation across group sizes, while the marginal group return was fixed across groups. Overall, we found that when temptation increased with group size, 20-person groups cooperated significantly less than 4-person groups in one-shot interactions, and that this effect was explained by lower expectation of others' cooperation, less perceived collective efficacy, and greater perceived conflict. However, 40-person and 4-person groups did not vary in one-shot cooperation. Importantly, reputation-based partner choice and punishment invariably promoted one-shot cooperation in groups of different sizes. These findings suggest no simple effect of group size on cooperation and underscore the utility of reputation and punishment in fostering cooperation (at least in one-shot interactions) regardless of the size of groups.

show abstract

Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

Cited by 10 publications

References 23 publications

Dilemma of Dilemmas: How Collective and Individual Perspectives Can Clarify the Size Dilemma in Voluntary Linear Public Goods Dilemmas

Dilemma of Dilemmas: How Collective and Individual Perspectives Can Clarify the Size Dilemma in Voluntary Linear Public Goods Dilemmas

What Do We Learn from Public Good Games About Voluntary Climate Action? Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment

Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About