Group membership, team preferences, and expectations

Guala, Francesco; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, Matteo

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.003

Cited by 73 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Evidence has shown that group identity affects interaction attitudes, such as reciprocity concerns, altruism, and the willingness to cooperate or punish (Bernhard et al, 2006;Chen and Li, 2009;Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001;Goette et al, 2006;Guala et al, 2013). Beginning with the pioneering work of Tajfel (1970), it has been extensively documented that individuals favor ingroup members, which suggests that a transfer to an in-group member yields higher utility than does a transfer to an out-group individual.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In-group favoritism and discrimination among multiple out-groups

Grimm

Utikal

Valmasoni

2017

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn this study, we investigate how and why people discriminate among different groups, including their own groups and multiple out-groups. In a laboratory experiment, we use dictator games for five groups to compare actual transfers to in-group and out-group agents with the respective beliefs held by dictators and recipients in these groups. We observe both in-group favoritism and discrimination among multiple out-groups. Individuals expect others to be in-group biased, as well as to be treated differently by different out-groups. Dictators' in-group favoritism is positively related to the degree of in-group favoritism they expect other dictators to exhibit. Moreover, we find that a dictator tends to be relatively more generous toward a specific out-group when he or she expects that dictators belonging to that out-group are generous toward members of his or her ingroup.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D84, D01, D64.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In-group favoritism and discrimination among multiple out-groups

Grimm

Utikal

Valmasoni

2017

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Empirical and experimental studies have stressed social and cultural factors, altruism and "warm glow" or merely the preference for cooperation, as important determinants of pro-social cooperative behavior (Andreoni, 1995, Crumpler and Grossman, 2008, Andreoni and Payne, 2011, Guala et al, 2013. In line with this literature, we consider in this paper that even while taking decisions individually, individuals remain social beings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…This feeling contributes to the individual's decision process. We therefore consider that individuals can behave as members of a group, i.e., be team-reasoning, acting under a "common knowledge of solidarity" (Bacharach, 1999;Bacharach et al 2006;Guala et al, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The We and the I: The Logic of Voluntary Associations

Melnik

Zimmermann

2015

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:This paper sheds new light on the economic logic of voluntary associations and the relationship between individual contribution and collective action. The aims are twofold.Firstly, we seek to explain how "team reasoning" (Bacharach et al. 2006) can deeply change the functioning of voluntary associations (which are considered to produce a public good) when some or all of the individual members group together to make collective decisions about their involvement or contribution, rather than deciding separately. Secondly, we seek to better understand the effects of heterogeneity of resources on individual involvement, in terms of both the budget constraints of individual members and their capacity to contribute differentiated non-monetary contributions to the association, in relation to the diversity of their personal abilities and preferences about the characteristics of the good produced.To this end, we use a model of voluntary association collectively producing a public good, where monetary contributions (compulsory fees plus voluntary donations) is combined with volunteering. We analyze the conditions for an association to offer profitable conditions to its members and the consequences that can be drawn in terms of its existence and size. We show that, at equilibrium, the level of voluntary contributions is ceteris paribus higher when individuals make their decisions on the basis of team-reasoning rather than individually. We analyze the role played by heterogeneity of incomes in the formation of teams within associations.We then introduce the concept of subjective quality into the basic model. The originality of the model is that we assume the public good to be characterized by at least two main components: quantity and quality. The quantity is considered here as a purely public component, insofar as all the members benefit equally from it. However, the quality of the public good is assumed to be a mixed (public and private) component. The agents can enjoy part of it in the same way, but there may be certain characteristics of quality that are difficult or impossible to measure objectively. Quality is always somewhat subjective, to the extent that perfect correspondence with the preferences of heterogeneous agents is unlikely to occur. In our model, the agents can contribute money and/or time and effort. The latter, which we call volunteering, allows them to influence the quality of the good (or service) provided according to their own preferences.

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“…Similar to how Guala et al (2012) induced groups in one of their treatments, participants in this experiment drew from a covered box at the entrance of the laboratory either a yellow or red arm band which indicated their group identity and their computer number that also determined whether they are Player 1 or Player 2. 17 Each participant is assigned a visually isolated computer terminal that corresponded to the number indicated on their arm band.…”

Section: Procedures and Payoffsmentioning

confidence: 99%

To Friends Everything, to Strangers the Law? An Experiment on Contract Enforcement and Group Identity

Panganiban

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Although the role of formal and informal institutions in promoting economic growth and sustaining exchange relations is now well established, explaining and differentiating how informal and formal rules affect individual behavior remain a challenge. This study aims to distill the essential characteristics of formal and informal institutions and disentangle their effects on trust and performance in exchange relations through a laboratory experiment. Formal institutions are modeled as third-party contract enforcement while informal institutions are represented as shared group identity. Results show that trust choices increase as contract enforcement increases but are not affected by shared group identity. However, performance is more likely to occur in interactions with in-group members than out-group members. Terms of use: Documents in

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Group membership, team preferences, and expectations

Cited by 73 publications

References 37 publications

In-group favoritism and discrimination among multiple out-groups

In-group favoritism and discrimination among multiple out-groups

The We and the I: The Logic of Voluntary Associations

To Friends Everything, to Strangers the Law? An Experiment on Contract Enforcement and Group Identity

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